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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

In October of 1968 the Peruvian military deposed the then cur-

rent elected government and started on a path of change and conservation.

The Revolutionary Military Government of Peru has been in power

for ten years and has gone through one coup and several reversals of

fundamental policy.

Tliis

historical experience has made it unique

amongst the military regimes of contemporary Latin America.

In the

wake of the establishment of this singular military regime, a small
rivulet of literature has sprung forth.

Sociologists and political

scientists have fixed upon this Hispanic society, and produced works
trying to classify and analyze this phenomenon.

I,

tribute to this effort to explain this experiment.

too, want to conIn my effort I shall

offer a coherent accounting of the actions and policy formation of the

military in Peru, in the period of 1968 to 1978.

This paper will

analyze Peruvian politics as part of a larger whole.
I

In this analysis

would like to establish the concern with ethos management as one of

the dominant forces in the Peruvian political process.

Political analysis deals with part of the mix of motivations
that actualizes human behavior.

Although culture has been accorded a

place in contemporary political analysis,

emphasis on it.

I

want to place a different

To that end this paper will present a logical progres-

sion of investigation.

First this paper discusses the nature of South
1

2

American culture and the process of cultural evolution.

The paper then

reviews a newer category of interpretation for Latin American
politics.
This is the corporatist school of thought.

The significance of inves-

tigating corporatist elements in Latin American politics is explained
next.

That is followed with a review of the current Peruvian govern-

ment.

This review is split into two parts.

The first part is an ac-

count of the Velasco government in the period from 1968 to 1975.

With

the ascension of Morales Bermudez in 1975 there is a genuine sea-change

and the second part analyzes the significance of events in the period

from 1975 to 1978.

1

CHAPTER

II

THE PURSUIT OF ETHOS MAINTENANCE

The impact of a nation's culture uniquely shapes its political

experiences.

However, the evaluation of cultural traits is often as-

signed a low degree of relevance in political analysis.

Peru is no different.

The case of

Since the ruling military junta took over, a

significant body of literature has been produced.

With rare exception

the central concerns have been to look for "progress" or a change in
the system.

Wlio

the questions.

possesses power and to what ends power is used are
The significant indicators are usually portrayed to

be decisions about the redistribution of wealth and decisions about

social mobilization.

The less tangible concerns in political activity

are not as readily analyzed.

Ethos maintenance is a phrase that describes the concern of a

significant body of political actors with preserving a value system.
It

is a value system that facilitates some very specific activities.

Ethos, per se, is a general state of mind:
The ethos is taken to mean the constallation of acquired
drives or motivations that are characteristic of the culture,
plus the goals, both explicit and implicit, toward which cultural activities are directed or upon which high value is
placed
.

^John Gillin, "Ethos Components in Modern Latin American
Culture," American Anthropologist 57:53 (June 1955) :48-59, as printed
Contempo rary Cultures and
in Dwight B. Heath and Richard N. Adams, ed
1965).
House,
Societies of Latin Ame rica (New York: Random
,

.
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,
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The activities and goals upon which high values are
placed by
tlie

inhabitants of Peru are very diverse and sometimes diametrically

opposed.

For matters of political analysis, one ends up focusing on

the educated,

professional or clerical, catholic, metropolitan, Cauca-

sian or acculturated mestizo, middle, upper middle, and upper economic

strata of Peruvian society.
This minority possesses almost all private wealth in the country.

It

runs the newspapers, universities, and schools.

They populate

the government civil service, the officer corps of the military, the

leadership of most political parties, and the native Peruvian enter])rises.

The existing society is the product of the goals and ideals

of these people and tliey are its chief beneficiaries.

Both what is

good and what is bad in Peru may be attributed to them.

The established norms, values, and goals of Peruvian society

have been put to an escalating questioning in the last thirty years.
In the last

fifteen years there have been formal attempts to overturn

the established society in Peru.

Continuing today, a basic questioning

of the society's operating values is being forcefully made in the

Peruvian political arena.
tem are on the line.

All aspects of the established value sys-

The ethical norms that make acceptable many of

the mundane activities of the powerful minority are being subject to

trial.

Examples of this are the questioning of the uses of private

wealth, and the questioning of the very possession of private wealth.
The right of a free press gets questioned in a society, where a wealthy
few owned the "private" press and pursued their special interests.

represent the
The validity of the idea that political parties will

5

peojile

is quest Loned

In a society/where literacy requirements keep
t

large numbers of adults unenfranchised.

These issues are specific

instances of a questioning of the larger value system that accepts
and

legitimizes
Tlie

a

existing order.

tlie

goal of ethos preservation is pursued because it provides

much broader analytic focus.

dously in the
tion

tliat

plored.

]H)s t— \\Jor Id

Political analysis has expanded tremen-

War II world.

The wide range of human motiva-

animates political actors is still not satisfactorily exTo establish a plausible reason for the emphasis on ethos

preservation

1

\

ant to explain

liow

human motivation is more fully

covered by empliasizing ethos-oriented analysis.

I

also want to relate

the emphases of political analysis to a typology of human motivation.
Witli

that for a starting place,

I

will look for the reasons the place

of ethos is difficult to find in political analysis.

Looking for the place of a national ethos in political analysis is something of a problematic task.

It is my

contention that this

is difficult because contemporary political analysis is oriented to

the evaluation of the concrete products of human activity.

The sig-

nificant aspects of human motivation are presumed to be discernible
in the conventional concerns with wealth,

control of structures of

coercion, and formal political organization.

These concerns with the

concrete aspects of power must be complemented with an appreciation
of the place of psychological utility.

The place of psychological utility becomes significant because
it

goes further in lielping to interpret human motivation.

The concern

there is one
of psychological utility gets treated by many authors, but

s

6

author in particular that has created a more fruitful
base for under-

standing human motivation.

This writer is the psychologist Abraham

Maslow.

Abraham Maslow, in his Motivation and Personality

,

outlines a

Hierarchy of Needs to explain the basis of human motivation.

description of

tlie

Hierarchy of Needs goes

a

Maslow'

long way towards explain-

ing how psychological utility permeates human action.

That gives me

my basis for criticizing political analysis.

Interpreting human behavior offers insights into the nature of
human decision making, and this gives one a firmer base for making

analyses of the policies and actions of political actors.
Maslow'

fications.

s

Hierarchy of Needs is prefaced by some general quali-

Maslovi/

prefaces his theory with the observation that,

Behavior is determined by several classes of determinants, of which motivation is one and environmental forces
is another.
The study of motivation does not negate or deny
the study of situational determinants, but rather supplements
it

2
.

This is further qualified with the observation that "not all behaviors
or reactions are motivated, at least not in the ordinary sense of seekii3
ing need gratifications, i.e., seeking for what is lacked or needed."

These qualifications set limits for extrapolating reasons for

political action.

1

have read these reservatinos as a statement that

human behavior is multidimensional and sometimes less than purposeful.
The possibility that human behavior is not one dimensional and is not

^Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper
and Row,

1970), p.

29.

^Ibid., p. 30.

.

7

rational limits the i)otential for constructing very
comprehensive laws
of political action.

The hierarchy alluded to consists of a succeeding
chain of

claims that people are concerned with meeting,
can be shown as

Schematically, this

ranked scale starting at the bottom and moving to-

a

wards the top;
7.

5.

A.
3.

2.
1.

The Aestlietlc Needs;
The Desires to Know and to Understand;
Desire for Self-Actualization;
The Esteem Needs;
Belonging and Love Needs;
Safety Needs;
Physiological Needs.
The most pressing needs are the physiological needs.

If all

needs are neglected then the personwho is so suffering finds all other
needs disappear, and they find that the dominant concern is for food,
sex,

shelter, sleep, etc.

4

As soon as these needs are satisfied they

recede into the background and the next complex of needs emerges.

This

cluster is referred to as the safety needs and they are specified as
"security; stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear, from

anxiety and chaos; need for structure, order, law, limits; strength in
the protector; and so on."^

This cycle keeps repeating itself until

conditions allow the person to meet the full complex of human needs.
It should be

pointed out that the Hierarchy of Needs is not

an immovable fixed order, and it should be pointed out that acts or

^

f

bid

.

^fbid.

,

p

.

39

.
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wishes express

nuiltii^ie motivations.^^

Throughout this scheme there is an implicit statement that

people (most people that is) are always concerned with looking after
their conscious and unconscious felt needs.

with meeting your felt needs

1

This comprehensive concern

interpret as a concern with psychological

utility
Political analysis is concerned with analyzing the use, pos-

session and transfer of power.

As practiced, political analysis often

ends up preoccupied with the material correlates of power.
ple, weiilth can be shown to be a source,
It

As an exam-

tool and end-product of power.

cannot, hov\/ever, be established as the exclusive or universally

paramount concern.
I

am asserting that psychological utility is ubiquitous in

human motivation, but this does not help to greatly simplify analytic
The economic

matters, as there

is

direct utility and indirect utility.

correlates should

l)e

looked upon as an expression of direct utility.

Matters of direct utility deal with the directly measurable power resources; who occupies

v^7hat

social base of power, who possesses which

material goods and how existing institutions operate are primary concerns.

factors can all be shown to have economic correlates,

Tliese

hence the temptation to do analysis centered on class interest or ecoPolitical analysis that is concerned with indirect

nomic benefit.

utility tries to deal with those social manifestations of values, culture, worldview, ethos, and personality that channel political activity.

^Ibid

.

,

p

.

23.

.
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This is observably difficult.

Political culture analysis is

the only established mode of this type of analysis.

measurable variables becomes a harder task.

Coming up with

One of the results is that

one often ends up making generalizations instead of formulating theory.
The modes of analysis can be related back to Maslow's elabora-

tion of needs in human motivation.

cover a wide range of endeavors.

As argued by Maslow, human needs

Once the matter of moment to moment

survival is met all of these needs make themselves felt.

concerned

v\rith

An analysis

direct utility pays attention to those events that in-

fluence the physiological needs and the safety needs.
some of the belonging needs and actualization needs.

It also meets

Analysis oriented

towards indirect utility pays attention to those events that affect
the esteem needs, and the desire to know and understand needs, plus

some of the belonging and love needs and some of the self-actualization

needs
In brief summation Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs offers a defini-

tion and model of human behavior.

This model of motivation allows one

to classify analytic schemes with regard to the facets of human motiva-

tion.

This in turn allows you to see what is being looked at and what

is not being looked at.

scheme.

It will produce

Ethos-oriented analysis is a vital analytic

information that will complement the informa-

tion generated by analytic schemes concerned with direct utility.

Another reason that ethos maintenance is going to provide useof
ful information for the analysis of a political system is because

its concern with cultural patterns.

This will provide a unique source

and.
of information because individual cultures are unique,

8

10

No one culture system completely satisfies
all human
needs and potentialities, each system has
defects corresponding to its virtues. Underlying historical,
cultivated
human nature we may assume a metabiological
human nature
which contains a reservoir of potentialities
and capabilities which are available for future cultural
exploration.^

Hence the necessity of finding a focus to weigh
this.
Culture is construed as the agency that people have
developed
to meet their needs within the context of their
society.

tool, a psychological prosthesis.

It is a

Cultural values have been portrayed

as original products of the concern with finding ways
to meet human

needs.

This interpretation of culture shows that it is a way to meet

a Hierarcliy of Needs as postulated by Maslow.

Once instituted cul-

ture becomes a force in its own right, and an analytic entity in its

own right.

This institutes a dilemma as,

Once begun, the process becomes cyclical, societies
developing cultures, and the cultures in turn affecting
their societies.
There is no a priori logical necessity
for setting up a linear, one-way cultural or societal determinism and to regard another culture or society as the
primary determinant of the other.

Having covered my assumptions of human nature

I

operate on and

the concepts of cultural concerns related to political analysis in this

paper,

would like to explain my choice of analytic action.

I

In the

citation where the cyclical nature of society and values were stated,

I

see an obstacle to establishing comprehensive theories to deal with

specific variables examined in political analysis.

This dilemma may

push one back to another question that must be dealt with.

That is the

David Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1953), p. 81.
8

Ibid

.

,

p

.

104.
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matter of deciding whether your interpretation
of events can be ordered
into a theory.
As the field of political science has developed
there has been
a

consistent concern with basing the field on a firm
scientific foot-

ing.

In order to improve the reliability of political
analysis, and

to produce laws and models, practitioners of
political science have

been doing their best to pattern their analytic activities
on adaptations of scientific method as it developed in the physical
sciences.

While trying to appropriate the fruits of positivist philosophy, many
empirical political scientists have been consistently producing un-

successful models.
that most of

tiie

From my readings

I

have come to the conclusion

effort to construct political theory has failed.

Wliat

has happened is that a great volume of analytic approaches has been

generated and described as theories.

Constructing political theory requires
out a phenomenon to be explained.

a

decision to single

After one has formed the question

one should construct a hypothesis that will specify a relationship be-

tween the dependent variables and one or more independent variables.
If you are interested in a direct statistical relationship, you will

want to formulate a null hypothesis.

This states that there is no re-

lationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable.
You may reject your null hypothesis if you establish a significant

relationship between

yt)ur

variables.

iationship for your hypotheses.

This establishes a positive re-

9

David CJarson, Handbook of Political Science Methods
(Boston: Holbrook Press, 1976).
^G.
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Bill and llardgrave go into great detail categorizing
the

analytic schemes utilized by political scientists in comparative
government,

Using the categories that Bill and Hardgrave list,

I

have cre-

ated a tree to show how the analytic approach diverges from theory

formation.

This tree starts with the generalization and then proceeds,

—

Ge neralization statement of uniformities in
the relations between two or more variables
of well defined classes;

—

Hypothesis a generalization presented in tentative and conjectural terms;
Ap p roach

a predisposition to
adopt a particular conceptual
framework and to explore certain types of hypotheses towards the generation of theory.

—

Theory a set of systematically
related generalizations suggesting new observations for empirical testing;

—

Law a hypothesis of universal
form that has withstood intensive experimentation.
The analytic approach is the form that will be used for my

analytic comment, liowever,

I

will make an effort to speculate on some

theory formation in my summary.
A pursuit of ethos maintenance is a valid concern.

Human

needs are diverse, you cannot Balkanize them or explain motivation and

behavior by referring to a few aspects of the whole human organism.

Political analysis has to operate under these imperatives also.

I

have argued that analytic scliemes become preoccupied with one aspect
of utility, while ignoring other aspects of utility.

This general ob-

servation applies to the study of Latin American politics also.

In

the 1970s the scope of Latin American political analysis was expanded

The
^^James A. Bill and William Hardgrave, Comparative Politics:
Co.,
Publishing
Merrill
E.
Quest for Theory (Columbus, OH: Charles
1973).
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by the emergence of a corporatist conception of Latin
American politics.
Ihe tendency,

however, to focus on either direct utility or indirect

utility has persisted.

This prompts me to make this effort to advo-

cate the utility of ethos maintenance.
In

extrapolation

I

am stating that politics in Latin America

are observably different from the conduct of politics in other parts
of the world.

What makes this so are the unique characteristics of

Latin American society.

cultural unity

tluit

Many authors have argued that there is a larger

permeates the world view of Hispanic America.

My

roiidings of Latin American society impel me to agree with this argu-

ment.

The nature of this unique Latin American culture will be de-

scribed in detail

iii

a succeediiig chapter.

The significance of a re-

gional culture system lies in the ethos generated by it.

It is my con-

tention that politics in Peru are dominated by the concern with main-

taining the ethos of the existing society.

.

CHAPTER

III

NATURE AND DYN.IMICS OF A RELEVANT LATIN AMERICAN
CULTURE MODEL

The conduct of politics in Latin America is observably different from the conduct of politics in other parts of the world.

Wliat

makes this so is the unicjue characteristics of Latin American society.
Latin America has repeatedly been described as a culture area in its
own right.

Tliis

cultural differentiation provides a critical insight

for the student of comparative government.

Many authors have argued that there is a larger cultural identity unifying the worldview of Hispanic America.

Both historians and

anthropologists have pursued this topic, often in a separate development

.

Historians concerned with government in Latin America frequently start

iit

Richard M. Morse's "Toward a Theory of Spanish

American Government

.

^

Morse's work is seminal as he is the first

contemporary historian in the Anglo-American world to argue for the
unique historical expei'ience of Spanish America as the critical ex-

planatory factor.
A common starting point for an anthropologist developing the topic of Latin American culture is "Modern Latin American

^^Richard M. Morse, "Toward a Theory of Spanish American Government," Journal of he History of Ideas xv (1954) 71-93
L

,

14
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Culture

by John P. (,illin.

Ciliin is the most commonly cited author

in books examining Latin American culture.

He is commonly credited

with creating and championing the concept.

Examining both the efforts of historians and anthropologists
to expand upon

tlie

found that there is

idea of a common Latin American civilization,
a

a model.

will follow in this chapter.

I

have

line of anthropologists who have made a very

sophisticated effort to construct
ment that

I

It

is this line of develop-

This chapter is concerned

with describing the nature of a Latin American culture system and how
Peru is a part of it.

1

will then explain Emilio Willems description

of the Latin American cultural dynamic and what that does to the politi-

cal process.

People like John
Ricliard N.

Ciliin, Charles Wagley, Ceorge M. Foster,

P.

Adams, and Emilio Willems have done some fundamental work

in analytic concepts related to the study of Latin American culture

and it is with Ciliin that

I

start.

In a series of articles between 1942 and 1947 Gillen argues

for the designation of Latin America as a bona fide culture area in its

own right.

Althougli Ciliin is sensitive to regional variations,

Spanish America and Brazil are seen as recipients of a comparable
The general-

Iberian heritage and a comparable Colonial experience.

ized Latin American experience is hypothesized accordingly:

^^This was originally contained in Social Forces 25(3) (March
and reprinted in John P. Ciliin, Human Ways, Selected
243-48
1947)
opology (Pittsburgh, PA; University of Pittsburgh Press,
nthr
in
A
Ess ays
,

:

I%9).

,
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all are nominally Roman Catholic, and many of
the details of content and organization are those of
Iberian
Catholicism as distinguished from the Northern European
type.
Ideologically this culture is humanistic rather
than puritanical.
Intellectually it is characterized
and dialectics, rather than by empiricism and pragmatics
the worth of the logic lies in the manipulation
of concepts, not in the empirical investigation
of premises.
[We] find a vast variety of ideas derived from numerous sources ideas from the Enlightenment; from the French
and American Revolutions; and more recently from Marxism
ue see other Spanish or Spanish Colonial patterns in
town planning ... in family organization, official male
dominance, double standard of sex morality
specific
concepts of personal honor and emphasis upon form in interpersonal relations; and in the patterns of Roman law and
certain political statuses still persisting from the colon13
ial system.
.

.

,

.

.

.

•

•

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

A detailed description of agriculture, arcliitecture and clothing is

also made by Gill in.

Gillin states that his formulation is speculative and leaves
open the concept for expansion.

gators should pursue.

He lists several points that investi-

The nature of the sixteenth and seventeenth

century Spanish donor society was not well defined at the time of his
speculation.

He calls for such an investigation.

The colonial experi-

ence of Spanish America and Brazil is presumed to be comparable but

detailed proof is not furnished.

Regional variation is mentioned and

attributed to the environment with little explanation.

Change in

society is attributed to cultural diffusion with sparse example.

cultural environment is

Mierican environment.

a

The

somewhat stark Latin American or non-Latin

These reservations give copious room for re-

finement and several authors pick this up.

Wagley takes up

1

3

Ibid., pp.

tlie

82-84.

challenge and deals with several of the

17

larger gaps in Gill in’s formulation.

Accepting the "cultural common

denoma nator" of Gill in, Wagley creates
a typology of subcultures de-

rived from the larger tradition.
tures.

These are nine interrelated subcul-

The physical environment, the local economy,
and the rural-

urban dichotomy is credited with creating
subcultural groupings across

Latin America.

Similar sub-cultural groupings are described
as having

arisen in different countries.

These different subcultures give dif-

ferent emphasis to the general aspects of the
larger Latin American

culture.

As various countries contain different mixes of the
sub-

cultural groupings their individual focus is different
from one another.

This is offered as an explanation of how the countries of

Latin America can have a conmaon cultural heritage while being visibly

different societies.
Gillin's original typology was

American culture.
is

a

native culture and a Latin

Wagley sees nine distinct subcultural groupings and

open to his types being redefined into more groups, if this is analy-

tically relevant.

These groups are:

1.

Tribal

2.

Modern Indian Cultures (highland societies);

3.

Peasant cultures;

4.

Engenho Plantation (traditional);

5.

Usina Plantation (modern);

b.

Town Culture;

7.

Metropolitan Upper Class;

Indian Cultures (lowland societies);

"'diaries Wagley, Tlie Latin American Tradition: Essays on the
Unity and the Diversi ty of Latin American Culture (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1968), p. 36.

.

18

8.

Metropolitan Middle Class:

9-

Urban Proletariat.^^
One of the salient characteristics of these cultural
subgroup-

ings IS the linlcage of societal groups.

One of the characteristics

of the Modern Indian Culture is the presence of Hispanic
peasants.

Part of the Town subculture is a response to the presence
of peasant

communities.

The interrelated parts do not function in isolation,

there are many symbiotic relationships.

An example of how societies which are part of the same larger

culture can be distinctly different would be a comparison of Bolivia
and Uruguay.

ties--82%
39,^

Uruguay is the most urban of the Latin American socie-

— while

Bolivia is one of the most rural socieites with only

of its population in cities.

Bolivia, one of the centers of the

highland Indian population, has an Indian population of 63%, while

Uruguary has no known Indian population.

The presence of different

mixes of emphasis on the nature of the Latin American culture renders

hopeless analytic assumptions that they are interchangeably similar.
George M. Foster has handled one of the other points that must
be established for the argument of Gillin.

Foster did the detailed

research on Spanish society of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
He also carefully researched the social practices and culture items
[)resent

in contemporary Latin America.

Foster established an obvious

cultural continuity between the Spanish donor society and contemporary
Foster argued for the concept of reduction and crystal

Latin America.
15

Ibid

.

,

pp

.

83-84

19
•

lizaLion.
1

•

.
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Reduction and crystallization may be summarized so.

In a con-

quest situation the dominant donor culture wittingly
and unwittingly
goes through a process of screening and simplifying
the elements of

their culture that

tliey

convey to the subject population.

During the

initial period of contact there is a general acceptance of
the different elements of the donor culture and some internalization
of elements
of the recipient culture.

After an initial pattern is set up the

colonial culture becomes less permeable and is more resistant to latter attempts to modify

tiie

newly established society.

This is called

crystallization.
The process of reduction and crystallization explains why

aspects of colonial society were noticeably different from the donor
society.

It also explains why older patterns,

extinct in Europe,

persist in Latin America.
One of the contemporary extensions of the concept of a Latin

American culture is the work of Emilio Willems.
up the

Willems has taken

initiative of Gillen, Wagley, Foster, and Adams and written

Latin America

:

An Anth ro pological Synthesis

up looser ends left by his predecessors.

.

Willems proceeds to tie

He describes the historical

experience of Spain and Portugal before the discovery, as significantly similar.

He also describes the colonial experience as producing

the same results.

Books,

In both Brazil and Spanish America,

although some

^^George H. Foster, Culture and Conquest (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle
1960), !)p. 232-33.

^Emilio Wiliems, Lati n i\merica: An Anthropological Synthesis
Harper and Row, 1975), p. 150.
York:
(New
^
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Lhings took place under different auspices
(viz. the Indians being re-

duced by the conquistadors compared to the Indians
being reduced by
the j^-i deirantes )

,

the

result over time was often the same.

In his noticeably more comprehensive work, Willems
tries to

outline
with.

tlie

larger dilemmas that Latin American societies have to deal

Willems devotes space to the problems of governing a society

that operates under the impetus of the larger Latin American
experi-

ence.

In Willems 's eyes,

tliere are

four complementing experiences

that set the parameters of Latin American problems:

tage,

tlie

the

Iberian heri-

conquest, the colonial legacy and the belated modernization

of Latin America via secondary development.

This created some very

fundamental obstacles for any government trying to rule a Latin

American society.
Government in Latin America has had to operate with the tradition of a patrimonial state.

18

Willems makes a direct extension of

Max Weber's concept of patrimonialism to explain the traditional state.
A pervasive characteristic of the state in a patrimonial society is
the lack of differentiation between what is public and what is private.

Governmental positions bestow personal privilege, they do not entail
obligations.

The people are subjects, not citizens.

The governmental

machinery is expected to grant favors on a personal basis, not to give
All power flows from the head of state, and in theory

out services.
it

In practice,

is limitless.

the executive's power is limited by the

traditional expectations of the subjects.
18

Ibid

.

,

p

.

89

.

Beyond this attitude to
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power and government tliere are four currently
operating traditions
that influence government in Latin America.

These four legacies are
tion of autocracy,

a

a

tradition of rebellion and

a

tradi-

tradition of non-compliance with the law, and the

pattern of military involvement in politics.
There is a tradition of rebelling against unacceptable oppression.

Willems notes some seventy-six major rebellions on a citywide

or province-wide basis prior to independence.^^

Negro slaves, Indians,

mestizos, and creoles found cause to rebel on a regular basis.

The

desire for freedom, the encroachment of land by big landowners, the
need to replace a particularly venal or inefficient bureaucrat, the
need to repeal a tax ruinous to a local economy or the operation of a

trade monopoly that bore harshly on the citizenry

— all

these prompted

large and occasionally successful rebellions.
The idea that the citizenry ought to rise up when faced with
an unbearable wrong is closely complemented by the idea that non-

compliance with the law

is

acceptable.

The combination of predatory

tax systems, restrictive trade monopolies, and an absolutist rule of
a distant colony rendered it necessary or desirable for large numbers

of the inhabit^ints to ignore the law.

20

Law enforcement became

problematic as the inability of the colonial government to enforce

unpopular statutes was established.

It

is here that colonial func-

tionaries created the philosophy of obedzco
19 .,

Ibid
•

,

p.

23.

,

p.

179.

)
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Two other complementary patterns are the
autocratic heritage

and the involvement of military tradition.

The autocratic heritage is

a function of a patrimonial state where all
decisions are a prerequi-

site of the king.

The granting of authority to regional or local

governments might have been functionally desirable, but it was
regarded as too potentially subversive.

A strong central government

ruled by an executive, with discretionary powers to take personal
action, was thouglit to be necessary if not desirable.

The authoritarian tradition worked with a pattern of military

involvement in politics to produce the high incidence of military
government.

Willems starts with the caudillo and gives a common in-

terpretation of the breakdown of authority, after the independence, as
the cause for the participation of the military in politics. 22

These ongoing traditions have made the conduct of politics
unique in Latin America.

Viewing Latin America as a culture system is significant for
the study of comparative government as it may reveal or suggest the

centrality of integration in a society.

Willems does this and ar-

rives at a conclusion held by many political scientists.

That is,

the conclusion that the crisis of Latin American culture and the crisis
of the different Latin American societies is a crisis of national in-

tegration.
V\/iliems

^^Ibid.
Ibid

.

describes

,

p.

92.

,

p

88.

a

cultural dynamic centered around adaptation

,

.

.

.
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and integration.

The author's points may be abstracted into
the fol-

lowing statements.
A culture must be able to adapt to a changing environment.

1.

The

etjji

d

Pqj-

^

given society's culture is to meet the need

to cope with internal or external dilemmas^^

(viz. how to propagate

the group identity that will impel people to work for
common goals).

This is a response to the need to adapt to a changing or potentially

changing environment
(]ultural evolution is a necessity for a society's adapta-

2.

tion.

The ultimate test of a successful culture is the survival of the

society.

24

Cultural evolution is a necessity for all but the most

isolated and static societies.

Although cultural evolution is

3.

a

the internal differentiation of the society.

necessity it depends on
Willems specifically

states that,
cultural evolution of a society refers to all the
processes that produce internal diversification and increasing specialization of the diversified parts.
In the social
structure, evolution is virtually identical with divisions
of labor (i.e., tlie dividing and subdividing of social
groups and the assignment to them of specific activities)
with
Evolution of the social structure goes hand in hand
nc
evolutionary changes in technology and economy.'^-’
.

.

.

4.

Internal differentiation depends on integration.

The prob-

lem of Latin American societies becomes the problem of national inte-

gration.
23

25

Willems states the proviso for successful evolution: "The

Ibid.

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

,

|5

.

166

p

.

165

.

.
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viability of growing internal differentiation depends
of course on
integration

the maintenance of a common structure capable
of relating

the different units to one another.

These statements taken in a sequential progression infer
that
the success or ultimate test of a society is its
ability to viably re-

late

tiie

different social groups to one another.

Failure to devise or

maintain a mechanism for national integration may push a country
into
a
t

state of anomie or class warfare (depending on your analytic predilec
ion)
It

this point that we may make the transfer from anthro-

is at

pological survey to political analysis.
Many analysts of Latin politics have made the point that
all Latin American countries are beset by varying degrees of conflict
that results from the lack of national integration.

one such social scientist.

Carlos Astiz is

Astiz is concerned with analyzing Peruvian

politics and he is quite sure about what the basic issue is in that
society.

The issue is what kind of society shall we have and what

will the power relations be.

This is stated so; "The most pressing

issues in Latin America generally, and in Peru specifically, are those

concerned with the fundamental character of the social order itself,
not whether this or that group should be favored by a particular

policy that will achieve common goals."

27

Peru is a country that is intimately involved in the Spanish

Ibid

.

,

p

.

166.

Carlos Astiz, ’ressure Croups and Power Elites in Peruvian
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. ix.
I
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American tradition.

It has been subject

legacy as its Latin American conf reres

.

to the same larger cultural

And Peru like the rest of

Latin America has come into the modern
world tlirough a process of

secondary development.

(Willems here accepts Richard N. Adams’s
the-

sis 28,)
.

.

National integration is
societies have inherited.

a

problem that most Latin American

The withdrawal of Spanish authority, follow-

ing the wars of independence, was the first
serious impairment of in-

tegrating mechanisms in Latin American society.

The second common

disequil Ibrating experience was the wholesale movement into
modernity
via secondary development.

Peru operates with this legacy.

There are many local characteristics that produce a potential
for conflict.

Peru

is

a diverse society and a traditional one.

Fric-

tions betv\?een the Indian and non-Indian community can and do arise.

The rural and the urban populations have different interests, and an

urban proletariat has a hard time marshalling acceptance in a society
in which it is not paramount.

A society as conflict-prone as Peru is going to be concerned

with integrating mechanisms.
flects this.

And the current political situation re-

The government of Peru has been cast as a corporatlvist

experiment by several authors.

1

will examine the idea of corporativ-

ist politics and explain why this is attractive to the dominant politi-

cal actors in Peru.

28

Wi 1 lems

,

p

.
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CHAPTER

IV

C0RP01l,\TISM AS AN ANALYTIC APPROACH

Corporatist political philosophy is not new.

Middle Ages saw
society

s

al basis.

a

In the West, the

feudal society that first proposed the .idea that

best interests are met by organizing interest on a function-

The ideal of defining society by functional sectors faded

under the dual impact of the Enlightenment and the beginning of the

Industrial Revolution.
anomic,

As society became more urban, industrial and

interest in the idea reemerged in Europe.

Corporatism in another branch of European cultural expansion,
Latin A.merica, had

Morse

lias

a

different history.

It can be argued, as Richard

argued, that a body of late feudal institutions and ideas

never quite disappeared from Latin American society. 29

Corporatism

can be shown to be present in varying degrees in the political and

social concerns of Ibero-Latin society.

This in turn renders cor-

poratism a useful focus for political analysis.
Three general approaches for corporatist analysis have evolved
so far.
I

They share some assumptions and disagree on other aspects.

would like to outline these three approaches, and then offer my uni-

fied analysis of the corporatist nature of Latin American politics.

The three authors that have staked out new territory in the conceptual-

^^This is part of an essay written by Morse, included in
Th e Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt,
Louis Hartz, ed
Brace and World, 1964).
.

,
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ization of corporatist analysis are Howard Wiarda, Phillipe
Schmitter,
and Guillermo O'Donnell.

These three authors are the primary referents

for contemporary articles arguing for a corporatist analysis
of Latin

American politics.

All three authors can be reconciled to a general

definition of corporatism.

For the example

1

will use a definition

that Pliillipe Schmitter has proposed:

Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest
representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarhically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not
created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection
of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.
The authors do differ on several points.

dimensions.

These reflect two

One of these dimensions is scope and the other is an eco-

nomic or culture dichotomy.

Phillipe Schmitter argues that corporatism

is an universal phenomenon, with two different types.

types is most prevalent in Latin America.

American and neither is

it a

One of these

It is not uniquely Latin

cultural manifestation.

Howard Wiarda

acknowledges the universality of corporatism, but argues that Latin
America is part of a larger Ibero-Latin tradition and thus possesses
its own unique brand of corporatism that is reemerging.

Guillermo

O'Donnell enters, third, with his conception of populist and bureau-

cratic/authoritarian corporatism.

O'Donnell argues against any unique

cultural forces and further restricts his thesis to South America

^^Phillipe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?", in
Wo rld,
The New C orporatism: Socio-Political Structures in the Iberian
University of
ed. Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch (Notre Dame:
Notre Dame Press, 1974).
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proper, excluding Middle America and Iberia.

O'Donnell insists that

events can only be meaningfully interpreted by examining
the nature
of capitalist development in the society being
observed.

Chronologically, Wiarda precedes the other two authors.

As

the other authors make some effort to state their
arguments in juxta-

position to Wiarda,
work of VJiarda.

I

will start my abstraction of arguments with the

Wiarda 's analysis is grounded on the observation that

there is a real, definable, cultural tradition in the Ibero-American

world.

In this common historical experience, and common cultural back-

ground, there are common conceptions of state, legitimate authority,
and the individual's relation to society.

There are common conceptions

of how you should channel political activity.

The central arguments

will be summarized in the following paragraphs.
1.

The West in general and the U.S. in particular has been
undeniably ethnocentric in trying to fit Latin America
into universal analytic schemes.

Wiarda argues for a recognition that Western social science
has done a poor job of explaining political dynamics in Latin America,
for most of the post-World War II period.

can be chalked up to ethnocentricity

,

Although some deficiencies

specific insensitivities in

/\merican scholarship can be explained by the polar opposition of major

environmental characteristics.

The American academic milieu can be

seen as an essentially secular and scientific establishment.

operating in

a

predominantly Protestant and pluralist nation.

It is

This can

raise problems witii efforts to analyze an essentially Catholic society
that possesses "as its basis a moral idealism, a philosophical cer-

tainty, a sense of continuity, and a unified organic-corporate concep-

.
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tion of the state and society.
2.

The Iberic-Latin tradition represents
development

a

fourth world of

In trying to compensate for the tendency to
use Western norms

of analysis it is not enough to realize that
you are dealing with a

non-Northwestern European phenomenon.

You must take into account some

fundamental characteristics that are unique to the region.

Wiarda

detects "fragments and remnants of a peculiarly Iberic-European
tradition dating from approximately 1500, with a political culture
and a

socio-political order that at its core was essentially two class,
authoritarian, traditional, elitist, patrimonial, Catholic, stratified,
hierarchical and corjjorate." 32
into functional intereses

,

This heritage has channeled politics

hence the special relevance of a corporatist

model of politics.
3.

Political change in the Ibero-American region has been a
process of adjustment.
The goal has been one of accommodation.

Reference

is

ondary development.

made here to Richard Adams and his theory of secAdams has proposed that national development in

the parts of the world that were isolated from the initial industrial

revolution is going to be different.

In this sphere of secondary de-

velopment, modern patterns of social and political organization are

borrowed and added on to the established socio-political system.
31

33

In

Howard \Jiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political
Change in The Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," World
Politics XXV9 (January, 1973) :210.
,

^^Ibid., p. 209.
33

Ibid., p.

227.

.
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this scheme of affairs, tliere is neither a
gradual evolution of the

society or an abrupt change of the larger society.

Instead institu-

tions and practices are added on to the original
society.

It is

Wiarda's contention that the Iberic-Latin society's
developmental experience has been one of secondary development.

Politics in most of

the twentieth century has been a prolonged debate
over how and under

what conditions the elements of modern industrial society
will be in-

tegrated into the existing political structure.

The result has been a

continuing parry and riposte between the older Ibero— Latin tradition
and successive waves of Western political formulas for social and

economic organization.
4.

ihe analysis of politics in Latin America must come to
grips with the dissolving of the older power bases.

Although the older tradition persists it does not exist in a
vacuum.

Some real changes have taken place, not all of the established

intereses have managed to age gracefully.
are eroding.

Some of the old power bases

In several countries landed wealth has been neutralized,

the social and legal influence of the church has been restricted and
the military has been steadily losing its ability to monopolize vio-

lence.

Politics is persistently becoming more dominated by class,

issues, and interest groups.

34

Although there has been some real

change, no clear alternative pattern has established itself in most of

The older order is faded, but what if anything can suc-

the countries.

cessfully replace it has yet to be made definite.
In contrast

34
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to Wiarda,

230

the next two authors play down cultural

.
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inputs.

Schmitter makes a determined effort to establish corporatist

politics as a broader Western phenomenon.

In Schmitter'

s

opinion, cor-

poratism is more an ideology than a function of cultural expression.
Schmitter'
1.

s

arguments can be classed into three basic assertions.

There is no sound basis for considering corporatism in
Latin America as an articulation of an unique historical
tradition.
First Schmitter points out that the advocates of corporatism

in the Iberian peninsula, and Latin America, based their movements or

programs on the writings and government from Europe.
up a bibliograpliy of works,

poratism.

from 1850 to 1950, concerned with cor-

is examined,

If tills list

Schmitter draws

it appears that there are very

few Latin American or southern European authors who appear before the

second quarter of the twentietli century.

35

This argument that the

theoretical elaborations of corporatism are an European construct is
important.

This places a valuation on formal theory over de facto

practices
2.

Corporatist systems can be differentiated into societal
corporatism and state corporatism.
Schmitter makes reference to the work of the Rumanian corporate

theorist, Mihail Manoilesco.

Manoilesco distinguishes two types of

In corporatlsme pur

corporatist relations.

,

"the legitimacy and func-

tioning of the state were primarily or exclusively dependent on the

activity of singular noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered representaSchmitter calls this societal corporatism.

tive corporations."^^

^^Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?",
36
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Corporatisme subordonne is different because similarly structured
corporations are created by and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of
the state which founded its legitimacy and effective functioning on

^ther bases.
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Schmitter calls this state corporatism.

Societal cor-

poratism is a tendency that is found in advanced Western pluralistic
societies.

State corporatism is explained as a development of a floun-

dering pluralist political system.
3.

The emergence of corporatist politics is a direct function of the needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually to accumulate
further resources.
On a more fundamental level,

Schmitter argues that such sym-

pathetic analysts of capitalism as John Maynard Keynes and Andrew
Shonfield have shown tlat capitalist-oriented societies have an interest in establ Isliing coiporatist interest formation.

In an essay en-

titled "The End of Lait sez-Faire" (written in 1926), Keynes suggests
that private self-interest is neither inevitably efficient or inevitably
in society's best interest.

Because of the complex nature of modern

society there is a seer need for semi-autonomous interest associations
to mediate between the individual and the state.
is cited as suggesting "a return,

ceptions of separate autonomies."

Specifically, Keynes

it may be said towards

38

medieval con-

In more recent times, Andrew

Shonfield, the author of Modern Capitalism

,

is cited as arguing that

complex, interdependent, modern societies need to be able to predict

^^Ibid
38
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their future environment if they are going to be able to
make extended

plans for future economic activity.

This imperative biases state

and economic interests to favor establishing interest associations
and
to them encourage them to conclude modus vivendls

.

In this instance,

rational self-interest is supposed to be propelling people towards the

construction of a corporatist society.
Guillermo O'Donnell is one of the late contributors to the corporatist scliool of analysis.

O'Donnell originally formulated a theory

for explaining the development of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes

throughout Latin America.

40

O'Donnell's original work implied an emer-

gence of a corporatist "solution" and

it

does not require very much of

an extension to make this an analysis of the corporatist phenomenon.
In a later article this extension is made.

41

O'Donnell's general con-

ception of corporatism as a structure is compatible with Wiarda and
Schmitter, but his differences are sufficient to detail his contribut

ion
1.

There are old ideological continuities, but corporatism
in Latin America, as an operating set of societal structures, is an historically recent phenomenon.

Corporatism is seen as a result of a crisis of the state in a
society that has been penetrated by international capital.
39

^Ibid., p.

Specifically

112.

^*^Guillermo O'Donnell, "Modernization and BureaucraticAuthoritarianism," P oliti cs of Modernization Series no. 9 (Berkeley,
CA: Institute of International Studies, University of CaliforniaBerkeley 1973).
,

,

^^Guillermo O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the
State," in Authorit arianism and Corporatism in Latin America ed James
1977).
M. Malloy (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press,
,
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O'Donnell states that "our topic is 'Latin America'
only in the trivial
sense; the pertinent historical context is provided
by the political-

economy of nations that were originally exporters of
primary materials
and were industrialized late, but extensively in a
position of depen-

dency upon the great centers of world capitalism.

O'Donnell goes on

to restrict himself to discussing corporatism in
Latin America.

ceeds to restrict himself geographically.

He pro-

He then says that his hypo-

thesis does not really apply to Meso-Amer ica

.

O'Donnell notes that

special situations (such as large exports of oil) change his formula.

Although he does not say anything further

I

sion predominantly concerned with Argentina.

states
2.

tliat

read his work as a discusIt is

in this tier of

the bureaucratic-authoritarian state looks representative.

Corporatism must be further differentiated into the inclusionary corporatism of the populist state and the exclusionary corporatism of the bureaucratic-authoritarian
state
Inclusionary corporatism was a policy of the populist state.

Under the stimulus of the collapse of the Republican regimes in the
great depression, the state expanded itself with a new coalition.
The middle sectors and the military abandoned the commodity export

oligarchy, their liberalism and their laissez-faire.

Instead they felt

compelled to establish a new coalition that would protect the national

economy and come to terms with the emerging and disgruntled urban
If the established sectors were to avoid the choice

working class.
42
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between repressive stagnation or economic leveling, they were going to
have to generate meaningful growth.
is expanded to meet

It

is at this point that the state

the inadequacies of the national bourgeoisie, and

avoid the total control by foreign capital.

Under these regimes the

national government sponsored the creation of labor unions and interest

associations, created extensive public welfare programs (at least for
the politically recognized), and established state enterprises.

Within this inclusionary corporatism

tvjo

unexpected relation-

One was the escalating demand for more economic bene-

ships developed.

fits and political control by the urban working class.

The other was

the quick exhaustion of the import-substitution opportunities by the

newly protected private firms and the newly created national enterUnder the dual pressure of escalating and seemingly uncon-

prises.

trollable labor demands and exhaustion of the benefits of a program
of import substitution,

those countries that had embarked on a program

of populist corporatism were forced to reconsider their commitments.
It

is under these conditions that bureaucrat ic— authoritarian states

were established to implement an exclusionary corporatism.

Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are portrayed as established
on two principles.

One principle is that a prominent place for dynamic

international capital must be established to invigorate the national
economy.

demands
The other principle is that the strident and dangerous

in order to bring
of the popular sector will have to be deactivated

foreign capital in.'^^

^^Ibid
46
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A policy that corporatizes political relation-
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ships can be constructed to do this.

This progression of affairs is,

see, an attempt to explain events in Argentiiia, Brazil, Chile, and

I

Uruguay
3.

The bureaucratic-authoritarian state contains two components, these are statizing corporatism and privatist
corporat ism.

The bureaucratic-authoritarian state is the main interest for

This is seen as the ultimate product of capitalist devel-

O'Donnell.

opment in Latin America.
a

The bureaucratic-authoritarian state engenders

bi-frontal corporatism.^^

is statizing corporatism.

The first element of bi-frontal corporatism

Here a process of conquering and subordinat-

ing the private organizations of the society is created.

there is privatist corporatism.

After that

Privatist corporatism is the process

of opening the organs of the state to colonization by private inter-

ests.

is O'Donnell's opinion that statizing corporatism is practiced

It

on the popular sector while privatist corporatism is open to the dominant

classes
In the previous pages of this chapter,

I

have described and

politics
summarized the association of corporatism with the analysis of
in Latin America.
so far

I

descriptive
As my discussion of corporatism has been

the poswould like to offer some interpretation to flesh out

approach.
sible significance of a corporatist analytic

The emergence

for Latin American
and expansion of a corporatist school of analysis

politics has been an abrupt phenomenon.

Douglas A. Chalmers acknowl-

regimes seem to fit logically
edges that Latin American authoritarian
47

Ibid.
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into this perspective.

However, he cautions that "it is sobering to

remember, however, that each wave of regimes since World War II (at
least) has brought analyses which seemed to show that the most recent

type of regime was likely to endure because of its fit with underlying

conditions.",,48

It

is with this forewarning that the proposed models of

corporatist politics must be examined.
As the speculation about the possible nature of corporatist

politics has preceded over time, hypotheses have grown and elaborated
in reaction to prior speculations.

Although much of what the cited

authors have written may appear to be in conflict with one another,
much of tlieir analytic efforts are compatible.

The general proposi-

tions put forward by the three authors contribute to each other, and

some of the elements are already combined.

O'Donnell acknowledges

that there is an ideological continuity with the past (from Wiarda)

although he is uncomfortable with the idea that there is a persistent
Wiarda, in the Pike and Stritch book, sees the

cultural tradition.

societal corporatism and state corporatism typology (from Schmitter)
as a relevant expansion.
It

is

in the cultural versus economic realm that the differ-

ence crops up.

The perception of value systems and the relative degree

of autonomy that sucli systems possess seems to be where the dispute
lies.

Both Sclimitter and O'Donnell seem to feel that corporatism is

rule
an ideology, a rationalization of relationships produced by the

Corporatism is a tail wagged by the economic

of economic interest.

aimers, "The Politicized State in Latin America,"
America ed James M.
in AniJ^rj_t^rjjniism and Corporatism in Latin
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), p. 36.
MalToy^Pittsburgh, P.

^^Douglas

A.

Cl

,

.

:

.

38

^*^8'

Wiarda

s

fomiulat ion, vnlue sysionis are ceded enough autonomy

to motivate political actors by themselves.

nomic crisis is a strong reinforcement.

It

is noted that an eco-

It is also noted that an eco-

nomic crisis may act as a trigger mechanism, but there is a conscious

attempt to avoid a drift toward economic determinism.
The question of motivation behind the creation of corporatist

structures is the hazy area.
liave

seen

a

All of the countries of Latin America

profound change in the nature of their economies within

the last fifty years.

They have also witnessed a profound change in

the constitution of their social order.

Keeping this in mind there are

two general foci that the competing theories must deal with.

One of

these foci is the lack of a tight socioeconomic interchangeability

among the Latin American countries.

The other focus is the persist-

ing but variable influence of some non-economlc interest groups in the

different societies.

Functional groups such as the Church, students,

military, or the state tecnicos can exert a critical influence in

domestic politics.
Once you move beyond the question of the source of corporatist

structures and face the question of the impact of corporatist movements or corporat ist-based policies, there is a higher order of compatibility.

As a base it can be asserted that there is a real cor-

poratist tradition present in most Latin American societies.
fluence and autonomy is debated.

Its in-

In addition, a succession of Latin

estab/\merican military juntas have displayed a strong interest in

lishing formal corporatist structures.
by a comThe newly proliferated governments can be classified
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pound Lypology extrapolaLod from Lhe original three
authors.
to classify a government

In order

in Latin America you should first ask oneself

a series of questions.
C orporat ism.

ture,

Does the government reserve the right to struc-

subsudize and control all political activity?

fication you would

liave

As a further quali-

to ask whether the government is predisposed

to structure |)olitical activity along the lines of functional
representa-

tion.

A government that tries to structure, subsidize, and control

political activity cilong the lines of functional representation may

generally be rel erred to as corporatist.
Societ a l corporatism

.

In order to further classify corporatist

governments, your next question would be whether the government you are

observing is conunitted to
corporatism.

a

program of societal corporatism or state

If the legitimacy and

functioning of the state depend

upon the activities of the functional interests, then you could classify
your government as an example of societal corporatism.
S tate

corporatism

.

If,

however, the government can be observed

to draw its legitimacy from other sources

(such as the army or a politi-

cal party) and it becomes conunitted to keeping its functional interest

groups as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state, then you are

observing state corporatism.
1

nclusionary corporatism

inclusionary

cor[)oriiL

.

A state committed to a policy of

ism is interested in using its corporatist struc-

ture to activate social groups for its support.
B -f ro n tal
i

cawporat ism.

A state committed to the structure

of state corporatism and follovjing an exclusionary corporatist program

e
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is further marked by a bi-frontai

corporatism and

a

corporatism in which

a

privatist

statizing corporatism are operating.

Privatist cor poratism

.

Here in privatist corporatism, the

corporatizing policies are used to open the offices of the state to
select groups, as a means of controlling those groups.

Statizing corporatism

.

In the

statizing corporatism the cor-

poratizing structure is used to infiltrate and subvert independent
social groupings to exercise control over them.
This compound typology is a range of activity that a government committed to
It

is helpful

a

de

i

ur

corporatizing of society may engage in.

as the people who wish to investigate the motivation

behind a corporatizing government have some kind of model to derive
intent

An active interest in ethos maintenance is the intent

from.

am investigating.

1

am asserting that this is propelled or activated

by a keen awareness of the current, dominant, political forces.
is,

I

the lack of national

That

integration.

The previously mentioned process of change has repeatedly

raised crises of national integration.

It

is the crisis of national

integration that produces an interest in erecting corporatist structures in the twentieth century.

1

would like to propose that attempts

to attribute the reemergence of corporatism to any one single cause are

going to

j:)rove

fruitless.

Although there is

a

general historical tradi-

tion common to all of the countries, and although there are some general

economic relationships common to all, all Latin American societies do
not operate

in

an interchangeable environment.

American governments throughout

tlie

A wide range of Latin

twentieth century have repeatedly

.

4L

stated that they want to find an authentically national solution.

This

ubiquitous desire is a realistic reflection of the critical differences
that

1

have mentioned.

It

is my feeling that these traits should be

accounted for whenever an understanding of Latin American politics is
attempted
The crises of national integration have a potential for crystal-

lizing along class lines, ethnicity lines, regional lines, or any combination of

tlie

three.

The different potentials for conflict are repre-

sented in the statistics about these societies.
used to point out

tlie

Tables

1

and

2

will be

differences.

Countries like Argentina, with a population that is 82% urban
and an economy that is strongly oriented towards manufacturing, com-

merce and services,
conflict

tlian a

lias a

much greater potential for classical class

country like Paraguay.

Paraguay is predominantly rural

(60%) and possesses an extremely simplified economy with the bulk of

the population engaged in hunting, fishing, agriculture and forestry.

That is 55% of the economically active population.

Countries like Peru, with an Indian population of 47%, or
Bolivia, with an Indian population of 63%, have a high potential for

ethnic polarization.

Columbia with an Indian population of 1.6% or

Uruguay, with no listed Indian population, will never have to face
the stresses of a society stratified on ethnic lines.

The net effect

crisis
of the observable statistical differences is that the type of
of national integration varies from society to society.
of crisis of national

response will differ.

As the type

integration varies so the variety of corporatist

:
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TABLE

1

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
BY INDUSTRY

INDUSTRY*

COUNTRY
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Argentina

.14

.05

.19

.09

.15

.07

.26

.09

Bolivia

.63

.04

.10

.06

.06

.02

.07

.02

Brazil

.44

.06

.11

.06

.08

.04

.24

.02

Chile

.21

.03

.16

.07

.12

.06

.28

.09

Colombia

.39

.01

.16

.05

.14

.04

.23

Costa Rica

.37

.01

.12

.07

.11

.04

.24

.05

Cuba

.30

.20

.06

.12

.06

.25

.02

Dominican Republic

.44

.08

.02

.06

.04

.14

.21

Ecuador

.56

.01

.15

.03

.07

.03

.13

.03

El Salvador

.47

.00

.08

.02

.07

.03

.14

.19

Guatemala

.57

.14

.04

.07

.03

.13

.03

Haiti

.83

.05

.01

.04

.01

.05

.03

Honduras

.67

.08

.02

.05

.01

.12

.05

Mexico

.40

.01

.17

.05

.10

.03

.20

.05

Nicaragua

.46

.01

.12

.04

.10

.03

.23

.01

Panama

.38

.08

.06

.12

.04

.23

.08

Paraguay

.55

.15

.04

.07

.03

.15

.03

Peru

.45

.02

.15

.04

.11

.04

.17

.03

Uruguay

.17

.21

.05

.02

.13

.06

.27

.08

Venezuela

.20

.02

.18

.08

.19

.07

.25

.01

*KEY

:

= Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishing;
2 = Mining and Quarrying;
3 = Manufacturing Industries;
1

4

==

=
6 =
7 =
8 =
5

Construction, Utilities, Sanitation;
Commerce;
Transport, Storage and Conmiunica t ion
Services;
Other.

Tlie Statistical Abstract of Latin
Taken from James W. Wilkie, ed
published by the UCLA Latin American Center, Vol. 18,
/\merica, 1977
.

,

(1978)

,

p.

46.

,
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TABLE

2

AND URBAN POPULATION (197 5) AND
ESTHIATED AMERIND POPULATION

IU1}L\L

POPULATION

POPULATION

COUNTRY

I

LAK

URBAN

RURAL

Argentina

.81

.19

I960

.6

Bolivia

.39

.61

1960

63.0

Brazil

.51

.49

1960

1.5

Chile

.73

.27

1960

3.2

Colombia

.63

.37

1961

1.6

Costa Rica

.35

.65

1962

.6

Cuba

.54

.46

Dominican Republic

.41

.59

Ecuador

.50

.50

1961

30.4

El Salvador

.42

.58

1961

.4

Guatemala

.32

.68

1959

53.6

Ha i t

.20

.80

Honduras

.31

.69

1960

5.5

Mexico

.

66

.34

1960

8.8

Nicaragua

.44

.56

1960

2.9

Panama

.54

.46

1960

5.8

Pa raguay

.40

.60

1960

3.8

Peru

.54

.46

1960

46.7

Uruguay

.82

.18

Venezuela

.76

.24

1960

1.5

i

AMERIND %

Taken from James W. VJilkie, ed., The Statistical Abstract of Latin
America, 1977, published by the UCLA Latin American Center, Vol. 18,
(1978), pp. 81, 83.
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The related concerns in this paper are national integration,

ethos maintenance and corporatist politics.
that

1

It

is these three subjects

will establish an interrelationship betvjeen.
The concern with the crisis of national integration sets the

other two concerns into perspective.

The crisis of national integra-

tion in Peru has been steadily evolving for almost fifty years.

The

dimensions of the crisis have reached a point where the very nature of
the future Peruvian society is in doubt to large numbers of the cur-

rent power holders.

This anxiety over the imminent overturning of the

social order has

a

liad

two-fold effect.

The first effect is to gener-

ate a strong consciousness about just what exactly is the nature of

Peruvian society.

The second effect is to stimulate a great deal of

thought in examining exactly what will serve as the previously established "common structure capable of relating the different units."
The evolution of this crisis and the development of a political

response will be the focus of the arguments in the following chapters.

CHAPTER

V

CRISIS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN PERU: FROM THE
OF LEGUIA TO THE REVOLUTIONARY

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

iolltics in Peru in the middle third of this century have centered on the very fundamental questions concerning the nature
of

society.

The topics of contention have been issues such as which

populations should be included in the national society.
of

The question

how power and wealth will be distributed has been prevasive also.

But the paramount issue is

gration.

tlie

diienuna on how to handle national inte-

During most of this period there has been a lack of a com-

prehensive political consensus.

Given this lack of a guiding value

system, many of the efforts of Peru's political actors are concerned

with establisliing a legitimacy for their goals.
1

would like to argue that one of the products of the political

conflict in this period is the development of a consensus on what the

"rules of the game" are for

tlie

political actors.

This consensus has

been contributed to by noted Peruvian intellectuals, and Peruvian

political activists.

It has spread amongst

the contending political

parties and even reached what is called the paramount interest group,
the military.

The Revolutionary Military Government, inaugurated by General

Velasco and his associates, is the culmination of
45

a

process of diffu-

46

sioa of values.

it

is also an assertive act of ethos maintenance.

is a realization that

It

the pressures for a radical disruption of society

had to be dealt with in a comprehensive fashion.

This is why the mili-

tary feels compelled to affirm the nature of Peruvian
society and

search for a compatible structure for national integration.
ihe society that the military springs from and that society's

attendant problems can best be established by examining the work of
three authors.

Francois Bourricaud, Julio Cotier and Carlos Astiz have

done the best job of describing the nature of pre-coup Peru.

I

will

sketch this society to suggest its dynamics and identify the context
that the political conflicts operate in.

With the nature of pre-coup

Peru established, my next step in this chapter is to cover the operational guidelines for Peruvian politics.

That is the ethos that the

military has striven mightily to maintain.

Having established the na-

ture of the society and the value system in question

I

can finish my

chapter and go on to explaining how this has stimulated the corporatist

experiments of the military.
When studying modern-day Peru, one soon finds out that there
is no one good book on Peru.

Sociologists, historians and political

scientists have all written extensively, and these individual authors
have emphasized different subjects.

One of the better analysts of
Her book. Power and Society

power and society is Franqois Bourricaud.
in Contemporary Peru

,

is cited by a wide range of authors to substan-

tiate their description of pre-coup Peru.

49

Indeed, must of what is

^^Some of these works include: Carlos Astiz, Pressure Groups
and Power Elites in Peruvian Pol i t cs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
i

,
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written by other autliors is an expansion or fleshing out of
Bourricaud's
original, insightful analysis.

Bourricaud emphasizes the salient points of Peruvian society.
The characteristics of her contemporary Peru are a society that
is

dualistic.

It

is a society that operates on the exclusion of a large

segment of the population.
Indian and non-Indian.

It

It

is a society split along the lines of

is a society marked by the presence of an

oligarchy, a society slowly and reluctantly being dragged into the
process of the democratization of that society.

Peru prior to the 1968 coup was a society dominated by its
oligarchy.

This oligarchy was essentially white, hispanic, urban, and

centered in the city of Lima.

Living in physical and cultural isola-

tion is a large "undigested" rural Indian mass.
rural,

This non-acculturated

Indian peasantry is the largest single segment of society.

They

are closely complemented by a group of Indians who have acquired some

degree of acculturation.

These are the Cholo's.

small but expanding middle sector.
are

v^;llite,

There is also a

The people of the middle sector

mestizo, professionals, government employees, shopkeepers,

and small entrepreneurs.

A significant degree of education, and the

absence of an involvement in manual labor, are Important in defining
their status.

Press, 1969); Jane Jacquet te "The Politics of Development in Peru"
(Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, June 1971); and David Scott
Palmer, "Revolution from Above: Military Government and Popular Participation in Peru" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, January
ed.. The Peruvian Experiment: Con
In Abraham F. Lowenthal
1973).
tinuity and Change under Military Rule (Princeton, N J Princeton University Press, 1975), there is Julio Cotier, Peter T. Knight and Jane
The anthology by David Chaplin, Peruvian Nationalism ^ _a
JacqueLLe.
Corpora t ist Revolu tion (Nev^/ Brunsv>/ick, NJ Transaction Books, 1976),
there is David Chaplin and Shane Hunt.
,

,

:

:

,

48

Bourricaud emphasizes exclusion in the culturally
stratified

Peru

describes.

slie

they are not.

The important middle sectors are defined by
what

That is,

in a country where the oligarchy is so sharply
distinguished as in Peru, the middle class may be expected
to define itself by its exclusion, whether forced or voluntary
from the elite.
And as the country also comprises a large
percentage of illiterate Indians, the middle class is bound
to be conscious of all that distinguishes it from
them: the
more so as the hierarchical scale is symbolically reinforced
by the racial and cultural distinction.^^
•

.

.

Into tiiis negatively defined middle class the skilled laborers

and unionized plantation workers may sometimes be cast.

The working

class in the urban industrial sense is statistically small and not

particularly effective in politics prior to the 1968 coup.
Politics in this society have been centered around the attempt
at one end of the traditional elite to maintain its privileged position

wherever possible, and to minimize the erosion of power and wealth over
time.

At the other end one find the forgotten ones, los olvidados

,

whose legal or extralegal focus has been on improving their precarious
existence.

The politics conducted by the established actors have been

described as a very elaborate process of accommodation, sometimes referred to as "superaccommodation.

''

Political change has been limited

as

Actually the old order, based on the cold-shouldering
of the illiterate masses, is being replaced, not by genuine
integration but by the partial acceptance of more and more
differentiated categories of persons who may succeed in

^^’’ran^ois Bourricaud,

(New York:

Praeger Publishers,

and Society in Contemporary Peru
1970), p. 58.

Povv/ er

49

organizing in defense of their interests or becoming acknowledged factors in the political game. 51
Peru is described as the explosion that does not have to take
place, the cataciysui that never arrives.

The basic power issues

,

and

the contending forces in Peruvian politics, are then succinctly sum-

marized as.
An oligarchy controlling at a distance a society with
which it does not feel a sense of identity; a rebellious
but prudent middle class; and a mass of under-privileged
citizens who find an outlet by organizing in defense of
specific and narrow interests or by committing brief acts
of violence whose political consequences have so far been
abortive such is the picture of Peruvian society.

—

This sketch

tliat

Bourricaud has produced is one of a society

defined in terms of its cultural groupings of oligarch, mestizo and
the liidian underclasses.

In the Mechanics of Internal Domination

,

Julio Cotier goes one step furtlier and describes the power of these

oligarchs and mestizos as the product of a system of internal domination of the Indian.

Cotier describes power relations in Peru as the product of a
linked system of international domination and internal domination.
Both by accident and by design the dynamics of power in Peru may be

described as a functioning system of domination.

Within the country

there is a linked system of domination between the modern costa and
the traditional ^l_erj-a.

Within the regions there is a linked system

of domination between the hispanic mestizos and the Indian underclass.

This distribution of power in Peruvian society is defined on a cultural

Ibid

.

,

^^Ibid.,

.

123.

p.

137.

p

.

.
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basis.

To the degree that power has been held and exercised by cul-

turally delineated groups, this establishes politics as a matter of
ethos maintenance.

The structural dualism of this society is a dualism of unequal
power.

There is an unequal relationship between the larger interna-

tional economy and the Peruvian economy.

In Peru the modern,

urban,

mechanized, industrialized and politically potent costa receives the
bulk of the domestic capitalization.

The yet traditional, rural,

primitive, agricultural and politically lame sierra transfers most of
its wealth to the coast.

economy.

It is saddled with an under-capitalized

Within the regions the mestizo segments own the land, the

stores and whatever investment resources there are.
lation of the
the high puno

and the sierra

c osta

and in particular the mestizos of

located in a strategic position that makes this

is

,

,

The mestizo popu-

group the lynchpin of the existing political, economic and social relations

53

The mechanics of mestizo domination that Cotier argues for are

described as.
The necessary and sufficient requirements of the system
of domination described are a function of the mestizo's access to the system of authority through his knowledge of
Spanish and through literacy which allows him to elect or be
elected and to designate or be designated to fill positions
within the system of "national authority or within the public administration" thus securing state resources to legitimize his lineage and his domination of the Indian masses.

in
^^Cotler, "Mechanics of Internal Domination in Peru,"
Chaplin
David
ed
Revolution
Peruvian Nationalism: A Corporatist
(New Brunswick, NJ Transaction Books, 1976), p. 39.
,

:
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Ib id

.

,

p

.

47

.
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This access to the system of authority, that the mestizo ele-

ments monopolize, gives them the opportunity to maintain themselves
in a system of domination.

around

tlie

The strategy for maintaining power centers

privatization of the state and segmentary incorporation.

The privatization of the state put the mestixo element in power

and it is aimed at keeping them in power.

restricted.
Q
Spanish.
•

,
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Suffrage has been carefully

A potential voter must be literate, and literate in
,,

ilie

huge Indian segments of society have never voted in

any of Peru's elections.

Although Indians may not vote, they are

counted for the purposes of representation.^^

This gives the rural

mestizo population a disproportionate representation in the congress.
in
,

some districts rural representatives only needed a fifth the vote

tliat

a

representative in Lima needed to achieve office.

57

This privi-

leged position has given the mestizo access to the power resources on
a

regional and a national basis without having to give more than

scant consideration to the Indian masses.
The discriminatory election laws have given the mestizo ele-

ments an invaluable power resource.

That in turn has led to privatiza-

tion of more of the state resources for limited group benefits.
the use of state lands.

of those benefits was

One

Prior to the establish-

ment of agrarian reform, the government of Peru had been endowed with

some agricultural lands over the years.

^^Ibid.

,

p.

49.

^^Ibid.

,

p.

5.1

p

52.

57

Ibid.,

.

.

The state rented these lands

,

.
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ouL

ill

liad

to prove that he

allegedly public auctions.
v^/as

a coimiiercial guarantee.

exceptional Indian.
the years.

In order for a citizen to bid he

literate, held a voting card, and could get
This was something beyond all but the most

Other privatizing measures have cropped up over

Parliamentarian initiatives were established.

The initia-

tive gives individual representatives the power to personally direct
a specific budget outlay

established.

59

to any purpose he chose.

Surname laws were

Surname laws are any piece of legislation directed to one

particular individual or group of individuals.^^

Accompanying this privatization of the state was a pursuit
of a comprehensive policy of segmentary incorporation.

with
tion,

a

Confronted

changing society and with a progressively mobilized populathe established pov^er holders had to deal with demands from the

larger population.

These were demands for wealth and power.

In a sys-

tem of segmentary incorporation the benefits of society are awarded

only to select groups or parts of select groups.

61

The different

social groups are incorporated into the national society in a partial
or incomplete manner.

For example, some labor unions but not all labor

unions receive the cooperation of the government.

A union that peti-

tions the government for recognition, insists upon government arbitra-

tion for a conflict, and supports a "reasonable” settlement from the
58
59
60
61

Ibid

.

p.

58.

p

55

Ibid.
Ibid.

Ibid

.

,

.
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labor ministry may find itself favored with a pay
raise or a good contract settlement.

Other kindred unions that do not seek to cooperate

may risk being given nothing.
Ihis picture of pre-coup Peru that is emerging is a
picture of
a society defined on rigid socio-cultural grounds,

a

society marked by

struggles over the control of basic power resources, and a society

where politics operate in a very
author that rounds out
Carlos Astiz.

tlie

v^/ell-def ined

structure.

The third

description of Peru's political context is

One of the hallmarks of Astiz's book is his detailed

description of how the extant parties fit into the larger Peruvian
social setting.

Astiz's description of Peruvian parties offers in-

sights into how they fit into the process of ethos maintenance.
Like many Latin American countries, Peru after independence
was headed by military caudillos or by civilians installed by military

caudiilos
tlie

.

As Peru progressed further into the twentieth century,

military found that it had to deal with

a

larger and more diverse

Simple force offered a smaller and smaller chance for

society.

political control.

Political parties became more and more indispen-

sable to the process.

So-called "modern," effective, and successful

political movements arose and absorbed most of the political activity.
To describe the poJltical process, Astiz uses the dichotomy
of electoral machine and ideological party.

Political movements in

Latin America are seen as producing one of these two types of organizations.
It

is

tion.

It

is

often hard to differentiate between local examples.

the degree of tliese qualities that provides the basis for defini

The ideological party can be identified by its commitment to a

,
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set of principles, its strong concern with nationalist
issues and its

ability to maintain its following in the periods it is
out of office
and out of power.

The electoral machine is created to meet the

immediate election needs of an individual or of a very specific
group.

Nationalist concern is more likely to lose out to the special interests
of the group.

Losing office or being pushed out of power can be fatal

to sucli organizations,

as patronage is necessary to maintain much of

its following.
in the Peru that

the Revolutionary Military Government took

over there were three established ideological parties.

ALianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA)
and the Christian Democrats

(DC).

,

These are the

Accion Popular (AP)

In addition, small but significant

Communist and Socialist parties have kept themselves on the scene over
the years.

groups.

All of these organizations periodically produce splinter

These organizations all operate as members of the Peruvian

power establishment.
Both the ideological party and the electoral machine have

operated in agreement in the political arena.

The extant political

parties have operated in a culturally and economically stratified
society, a society marked by the lack of national integration and a
lack of a unifying political consensus.

The ideological parties and

the electoral machines have agreed and cooperated in ethos maintenance.

They have accepted the "rules of the game" that the military and some

^^Ibid.

,

p.

89.

.

55

elements of the oligarchy had insisted upon.
ties that

I

All of the political par-

have mentioned are committed to a significant change in

Peruvian society, but all of them have accepted

operating code.

Tliis

agreement,

1

a very

well-defined

will reemphasize, is a commitment

to ethos maintenance.
Tlie

insistence, that ethos maintenance is the guiding principle

in Peruvian politics,

is a recognition that

there are very concrete

codes that regulate the conduct of politics.

These are canons that

derive from the impetus of the larger Latin American ethos.

principles are

a

These

product of the Peruvian historical experience.

They

are an adaptation and hence a very specific articulation that may not
be evident in other countries.

Elements of this guiding ethos may be

seen in five concrete principles.

These issues have been accepted

either in whole or in greater part by "those organized in defense of
their interests," as it is phrased by Bourricaud.
cant rebel had been the Ap ristas

.

The only signifi-

However, after a 30-year running

battle with the Peruvian establishment, APRA bought

....

guidelines

into the larger
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am asserting that the Peruvian military has been trying

I

to preserve the following very specific tenets.
1.

Elite Politics;

2.

Segmentary Incorporation;

3.

Catholic Christian Ideals;

4.

Authentically National Solutions; and

5.

The Middle Sectors Are Vital.

64,
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These principles can be expanded upon.

will try to show how they

I

are reflected in the commitments of the major political
parties of precoup Peru.

Elite Politics

A curious characteristic of Peru's political system is its

insistence that politics is best conducted by elites.

Direct popular

control of society is considered to be dangerous or irrelevant.

No

significant actor in pre-coup Peru advocated universal suffrage.

The

Peruvian constitution had insisted that voters be literate, and literate in Spanish.

it seems

plausible that

tlie

oligarchy would be hos-

tile to letting the impoverished and illiterate masses vote their im-

mediate desires.

It

is

less plausible that the reform-oriented par-

ties or the revolutionary socialists should be indifferent or hostile
to

the idea of popular control of political office.

But this is the

case and the political parties reflect this.
This is true of APRA.

In May of 1924, Victor Raul Haya de la

Torre founded the APRA party.

Ever since, APRA has been a signifi-

cant part of the Peruvian political spectrum.

The Apristas have been

portrayed as the more successful of Peru's political parties.

They

have been a well-organized, popular party, and they have received the

support of large numbers of Peruvians (literate voting Peruvians) over
many years.

One of APRA's characteristics has been a commitment to

working through a political elite.

The party has long held that

^^Frederick Pike, Tlic Modern History of Peru (New York.
Frederick A. Praeger, Publlsliers, 1967), p. 238.
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society has to be changed before universal
suffrage becomes meaningtul.

ihey have maintained that a small, restricted,
specially edu-

cated, elite drawn from

tlie

vital middle sectors would transform Peru.

A similar disaffection with mass politics may
be found in the

writings of Jose Carlos Mariategui.

A contemporary of Haya de la

lorre, and founder of both the Communist and Socialist
parties of

Peru, Mariategui mixed orthodox Marxist analyses of
society witli a

strong Indigenis ta sympathy.

As a committed Marxist, Mariategui be-

lieved in the necessity of forming a revolutionary vanguard.

In ad-

dition he was greatly Influenced by the ideal of the Andean civilizations.

"Natural" Indian communism as evidenced in the Inca society

was held up as a goal to be pursued.

Mariategui strongly discouraged

looking for solutions in European models and that included liberal
democracy.

68

Mariategui set the direction for the communist and

socialist parties in Peru and has been a strong influence in later

revolutionary groups.
The newer political parties were not significantly different

from the older parties on this item.

Accion Popular and the Christian

Democrats evolved out of the political ferment of the 1940s and 1950s.

Accion Popular was founded by Fernando Belaunde Terry, nephew
of the noted Catholic Intellectual Victor Andres Belaunde.

69

AP ar-

rived on the political scene with the advantage of having witnessed
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the travails of the Apristas.

Accion Popular deemed it wise to avoid

making threats to the basic nature of

tiie

society.

The question of

pressing for popular control of political office has been
put to the
party in the past.

A typical response has been quoted as,

there is very little interest in tliis matter as it
would arouse too mucli opposition.
Internally many in
the party would oppose such a matter.
The vindication of such a measure would be unpopular, we would be very
much criticized and moreover we would have major opposition
from the Army.'^
•

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The Christian Democrats were organized in this same period by
a group of Catholic laymen.

Europe,
Peru.

Inspired by the Christian Democrats of

the Democr istianos have pushed for major structural changes in

One of the characteristics of the party is a rejection of vio-

lence as an acceptable path for change, and an insistence that reform
be pursued through the appropriate constitutional channels.

Given

the literacy requirements of the Peruvian constitution this becomes
a coiimritment

to elite politics.

This skirting of controversy, this aversion to empowering
the people, is symptomatic of the widespread belief that the people

can't manage their affairs unaided.

The idea that some people are

better qualified to decide government policy, i.e., politics within an
elite,

is a

principle that the Revolutionary Military Government is

committed to defending.

^^^Cotler,
71

Astiz,

"Mechanics of Internal Domination in Peru,"
p.

126.

p.

57.
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S egmentary

Incorporation

Another aspect of Peruvian politics has been the development
of

the practice of segmentary incorporation.

Bourricaud made the

point that the old order based on the exclusion of the popular sectors

tiad

been replaced.

It had been replaced by a system centered on

the conditional acceptance of some sectors of society.

segmentary incorporation.

This is called

The practice of segmentary incorporation

has been accepted by the established political actors.

One study in

particular does a good job of highlighting how that is established.
David Collier

lias

ment policy.

One of the points he establishes is the use of land in-

done a case study of squatter settlements and govern-

vasion for instituting segmentary incorporation.
Collier focuses his study of squatter policy on the metropolitan Lima area.

The city of Lima witnessed spectacular growth, soar-

ing from havixig 6.2% of the national population in 1931 to having 24.2%

of the national population in 1972.
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As the population of Lima grew

the large number of poorly housed urban inhabitants began to look to
the seizure of vacant lands abutting the city.

As these seizures

occurred, different political actors recognized the potential for

political control in these legally vulnerable and politically dependent
group actions.
The advent of power brokering with land invasion incidents
is

traced to the dictatorship of General Manual Odria.

General Odria

in
^^David Collier, "Squatter Settlements and Policy Innovation
132.
p.
Lowenthal,
Abraham
Peru," in The Per uvian Exper iment ed
,

.

.
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took power in an anti-APRA coup that followed the abortive APRA
coup
of 1948.

General Odria and his supporters were not merely concerned

with repressing the APRA party.

They were actively engaged in an at-

tempt to build a popular movement that was independent of the Apristas

.

Odria establislied a common format for squatter invasions.
This became the norm for this type of political brokerage.

He estab-

lished a pattern of seeking out prospective land invaders and suggesting covertly or announcing publicly that the government would not evict

squat ters

The seizure would be organized, and carried off en masse.

.

After the territory was seized a community association would be organized.

To move into the settlemtn or to be given legal title to a lot,

one had to work through the organization.

It was expected that the

residents would be appropriately appreciative and turn out for desig-

nated government rallies.

Towards the end of his term, when the dic-

tator was considering running for the office of president, squatters

moving into the settlements were expected to join his party.

75

,

An-

other part of the pattern of power brokering was the illegality of

Although land seizure was encouraged and facili-

the land seizure.

tated by the government, the government rarely granted title.

The

resultant illegality of the occupation was an overt government policy.
This was calculated to keep the residents obligated to the government
and to make them dependent on staying on good terms with the officials.
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With Che end of the Odria government, the following APRA sup-

ported Prado government tried to change the dependent relations of

squatter and government.

Law 13517 of 1961 set up

a

procedure for

legalizing the existing settlements and for granting land titles.

Unfortunately the law included many stringent provisions that made it
hard for the designated government agency to grant land titles.

had the effect of subverting the law.

This

Government authorities soon

reverted to ignoring die law and dealing with the settlements on a
case by case paternalistic fashion.

produced little change.

Accession of a new government

After Accion Popular achieved power, land

seizures were not encouraged, but the status of squatters was not altered.

78

This state of affairs continued up to the last few months

of the Belaunde administration.

As a result,

squatter zones of Lima were held in

a

the inhabitants of the

state of legal limbo up until

the initiation of the Revolutionary Military Government.

The opportunity for political incorporation on a segmentary

fashion was not limited just to those who control the government.

Squatter invasions could also be organized by political parties that
didn't control the resources of the national government.
end of Odria'

Towards the

term, conservative backers of Pedro Beltran began to

s

organize a land seizure of their own.

Although they did not have

access to the authority of the government, they did have money to back

^

^Ibid

.

,

p

1A2.

^^Ibid

.

,

p

143.

^^Ibid

.

,

p

136.

62

their efforts.

iliey

also had access to public opinion and political

influence through Senor Beltran's newspaper.

On the local level, land

seizures could be organized to embarrass the national government and
aid municipal governments controlled by opposition parties.

After

the Belaunde government came into office in 1963, several municipal

governments used their resources to organize land seizures.

This in-

cluded several local governments controlled by the Apristas.

Collier's case study offers a pertinent example of the acceptance of segmentary incorporation by the political establishment.

Needless to say, squatter settlements are not the only sphere open to
policies of segmentary incorporation.

Dependent, paternalistic rela-

tions between the government and the different social groupings have

persisted and may be found in the policies of the Revolutionary Military Government.

Although initially chary of such an activity, the

necessity or desirability of segmentary incorporation has been recognized by the present junta.
it

They have continued this practice and made

part of the ethos they want to preserve.

Catholic Christian Ideals

Like the rest of the former colonies of Spain and Portugal in
the new world, Peru is a Catholic society.

The depth of the church's

penetration of some Indian regions may be open to question, but there
is no

denying that the church has held

a

near monopoly position on

1
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religious activities. B

The church has been present since the conquest

and has made a concerted effort to tend to the spiritual, ethical and

educational needs of the host society.

The days when the church could

operate without hindrance passed with the wars of independence and the
resultant growth of secularism.

In spite of this the teachings of

the Catholic church have had a strong influence ever since.

The terms of political discourse in this Catholic society

reflect Catholic Christian ideals.

implicitly.

This is done both explicitly and

An organization such as the Christian Democrats is rather

obviously motivated by the spiritual and ethical pronouncements of the
church.

Other political movements such as the Apristas have been for-

mally anti-clerical.

Disenchantment, however, or hostility towards

the church as an institution has not interfered with political move-

ments accei)ting the larger values.
The political significance of the church has long been appre-

ciated by Peruvian politicians, and has figured in several major con-

Political conflicts involving the church have been central to

flicts.

the political development of Peru.

In this century the Dictator Leguia

initiated his Oncenio (1919-1930) with an attempt to dedicate the country to the Order of the Sacred Heart.

This controversial ploy by

Leguia, himself a high order Mason, sparked a massive political outcry

tliat

started the political careers of such student activists as
.

Victor Raul Haya de la Torre and Jose Carlos Mariategui.
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^
the
As

disentwentietli century progressed and more of the citizenry became

^^Astiz, p.

163.

®"Pike, The Modern Hist ory of Pe,^,

P-

235.

.
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chanted with Criollo liberalism.

The position of the Church on social

issues became a base for castigating the semi-democratic and semi-

capitalist Peruvian establishment.
The importance of championing Christian ideals has been given

different priorities.

The short-lived fascist movement in Peru was

the most fanatical in the advocacy of Catholic Christian ideals.

Popu-

lar with the clergy, the fascits did not hesitate to attribute all the

problems of the country to the abandoning of Catholic moral and ethical
norms.

Frederick Pike succinctly describes their concerns as: "Fascism

in Peru was characterized by a disillusionment with liberal capitalism,

which was pictured as a selfish. Godless, materialistic system concocted mainly by Protestants, Masons and Jews and in total opposition
to the Christian spirit of the middle ages."

83

Moving along the political spectrum one can find much more
sophisticated advocates of Catholic Christian ideals in post-World War
II Peru.

Prominent Catholic layment began to search for an answer

to the foundering Catholic institutions of Peru.

General Jose Luis

Bustamante y Rivero, president from 1946 to 1949, was one of the first
Bustamante y Rivero articulated the concerns

to voice such concern.
3.

S

•

There is more and more the impression that too much
emphasis on the doctrinaire aspects is often placed from
the pulpit, without insisting enough on the usual Christian
There is sometimes a lack of human
norms of living.
indignation to harass social inChristian
of
and
emotion
There is fear of injuring
greed.
merchants'
justices and
are employed to
euphemisms
respectful
the powerful, and
the widespread
grows
From
it
condemn authoritarian abuses.
.
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belief that the church goes along with the interest groups
and maintains an implicit alliance with the temporal
powers.
.

.

.

ihis concern with the erosion of Catholic norms spawned a

commitment to political activism among Catholic laymen.
was channelled primarily to two political movements.

This activism

These movements

are the Christian Democrats and Accion Popular.

Chronologically AP evolved first.
the moving spirit behind this movement.

Fernando Belaunde Terry was
Astiz imputes that Belaunde

modeled much of his program around the programs of the Christian
Socialists of Europe and the Christian Democrats of Chile. 85
had

tlie

Belaunde

good fortune to have one of Latin America's noted Catholic

intellectuals, Victor Andres Belaunde as his uncle.

Accion Popular

fashioned a program in tune with the concerns of the Catholic estab-

lishment and successfully won the approval of Church over the

Christian Democrats in the 1963 elections.

86

Although Accion Popular

was not set up as a vehicle to advocate Catholic Christian ideals, it

was more electorally successful than the Christian Democrats and was

able to successfully preempt it.
The Christian Democrats evolved in the same period as AP

.

They

may be accredited with giving the advocacy of Catholic Christian ideals
The Christian Democrats made an effort to offer a

a liigh priority.

comprehensive analysis of Peru's problems.
84
85
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The Democr ist ianos
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rejected both Marxism and Capitiilism as valid ways of organizing human
society.

87

The excessive egoism of Capitalism and the excessive

materialism of Marxism had to be combatted, and the norms of Catholic
humanism had to be championed.
position."

88

The party sought to define a "third

The Christian Democrats have described themselves as the

first Peruvian political movement to base itself on Christian thought.

Moving down the scale of priority, for Catholic Christian
ideals, one comes to the Apristas and sundry revolutionary socialists.

APRA was formally anti-clerical and hostile to the Church, as an in-

stitution of the Peruvian establishment.

That, however, did not pre-

vent them from seeing man and state in terms that the church had defined.

Society is defined as an organic entity and the state is

charged with a paternal role.

The ends of the state are defined as

"guaranteeing the life, health, moral and material well-being, education, liberty, and economic emancipation of the working classes.

Political crises are seen as being moral crises.

90

.

.

Apristas see the

political solution for Peruvian society in a functional democracy
that will meet society's needs because it is a "political system in
v^7

hich the citizen has rights and duties as a citizen and also has

rights and duties flowing from his participation in the economic life

^^Ibid.

,

p

.

126.

^^Peter T. Knight, "New Forms of Economic Organization," in
The Peruvian Experiment ed Abraham Lowenthal, p. 357.
,
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^Ha r r y Ka n t o r The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian
68.
Ai^rista Party (New York: Octagon Books, 1966), p.
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I

of the country." 91

The theme of the spiritual renovation of Peru is

emphasized by the Apristas.
cal party.

Aprismo is described as more than a politi-

is described as a pliilosophical and moral movemeiit.^^

It

The use of religious metaphor may not be anything more than a recog-

nition of the powerful symbolism of Christianity in Peruvian societ-.
Whether it is or is not valid, APRA has not hesitated to assert that
'As surely as Christ suffered upon the cross, to the Apristas must

suffer to win the redemption of Peru." 93

Moving to the bottom of the scale of priority, one examines
the Marxist organizations in Peru.

One of the unique aspects of

Marxist movements in pre-coup Peru is the pervasive influence of Jose

Carlos Mariategui.

Mariategui established himself as one of the out-

standing Marxist writers of Latin America.

Within Peru his influence

has marked revolutionary groups ever since.

One of the paradoxes of

his writings is his insistence that communism was primarily a spiri-

tual movement, not a materialist movement.

94

Part of the validation

of the communist revolution in Peru was to be the spiritual renovation
of a Peru corrupted and debased by the capitalist penetration of

society.

with

a

Elements of Christian mysticism were not seen as incompatible

Marxist society.

Mariategui argued that "There is a mysticism

in Marxism and those who adhere to it come very close to the spirit of

91tkIbid
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the Christianity of

tlie

catacombs

In my preceding paragraphs

I

think that

I

have established a

concern for Catholic Cliristian ideals in the
Peruvian political establishment.

Throughout the twentieth century there has been a
persis

tent concern that the ideals of a Catholic society
were not being

adequately safeguarded.

There has been an ongoing concern that this

must be championed in the political arena.

That concern has carried

over to the military and they have made it a part of their
program of

ethos maintenance.

Authentically National Solutions

Another one of the guiding principles for Peruvian politics
has been the insistence that political programs reflect a truly

Peruvian response to the problems facing society.

One of the persis-

tent debates that ran through Peru in the early twentieth century was
the argument between the proponents of Indigenismo and the proponents
of Hispanlsmo

96

These two parties argued over the true nature of

.

Peruvian society.

This conflict affected the political actors.

The

Indigenistas succeeded in casting doubts on how useful non-Peruvian
practices or ideals would be in ordering a society that contained a
large Indian population.
By the 1920s,

significant elements of Peru's political estab-

lishment had begun to incorporate a rejection of European models of

^^Ibid.
96

p.

238.

Ibid., p.
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,

,
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political programs.

The issue appears to have become a popular theme

of Peruvian intellectuals in the 1920s.

The ever-wily dictator Leguia

seized upon this and warned that his dictatorship was necessary
to pre-

vent the advance of communism in Peru.

The communists in turn were

quick to assert that it was the Indian communism of the Inca society
.

that would provide the model for their society.

no

The Apristas re-

flected this trend when they argued, "Since Peruvian economic reality
is

completely different from that of Europe, Peru cannot take European

socialism and introduce it into the country." 99
That period of ferment successfully established the principle.
By the time the Cliristian Democrats and AP had arrived on the scene

central part of their programs.

it was a

Accion Popular claimed that

the significance of their program was due to their having searched
for truly national solut ions

.

The Christian Democrats put less of

an emphasis on the truly national solution.

What they did emphasize

was that their party offered a third way, a way that was neither

capitalist nor communist.

This was an implicit appeal to nationalist

sent iment

This insistence on truly national solutions and the hostility
to "foreign" ideologies was picked up and is one of the tenets the

military has chosen to champion.
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The Middle Sectors Are Vital

Peruvian politics has also contained a call to look after the
interests of the middle sectors.

This appeal for the protection of the

middle sectors has had many different justifications.

Victor Andres

Belaunde is credited with describing how the fragility and impoverishment of the middle sectors was responsible for many of the country's

difficulties.

He began to circulate this idea in 1914, and by the

1920s it had gained wide currency.

This theme was seized by several opposing groups.

Leguia and

his backers felt it was important for the country to look after the

interests of the middle classes.

This was seen as a necessary part

ot building a strong, modern nation and a healthy capitalist system.

102

Haya de la Torre argued that the country had to advance the welfare
of the middle classes for different reasons.

Haya, philosophically

argued that a large and vital middle class was necessary to

at least,

usher in the socialist revolution.

It was his argument that the middle

class was the revolutionary class in the underdeveloped countries of

Specifically,

the world.

the imperialism to which underdeveloped countries
are subjected is the first stage of their capitalism.
Hence the weak nations must encourage the imperialist
process, for it will create the capitalism which will
generate a powerful proletariat together with the middle
sectors necessary to lead the dov^rntrodden in a socialist
revolut ion.
.
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From this point on the middle sectors were courted by almost all of

mainstream political actors.

tiie

The only notable exceptions were the

communists, who stuck to the working classes as the vehicle of the
revolution.

Accion Popular and the Christian Democrats evolved in a political environment in which the importance of the middle classes was a
given.

Accion Popular offered

dle sectors.

a

program to meet the needs of the mid-

AP emphasized the expansion of bank credit, industrial-

ization and the importance of domestic entrepreneurs. 104

Democrats appealed to

tlie

desire of the middle sectors to prevent a

^
radical transformation
ofc society.
,

.

r:

.

The Christian
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This concern with the welfare of the middle sectors has been
a

pervasive part of Peruvian politics.

It has been an Important

principle, and it is an issue that the military has decided to work
f

or

These principles have been givens and a prioris

.

They have

formed a code of conduct for political actors in pre-coup Peru.

They

had been part of a common structure capable of integrating the differ-

ent units.

This system of elite politics, segmentary incorporation.

Catholic Christian ideals, authentically national solutions, and an

advocacy of the middle sectors was part and parcel of the dominant
value system.

These practices were part of a value system that has

defined Peruvian society.

It

is a value system that defines the pos-

Astiz, p. 114.
ge
^^^Lowentlial, T he Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Chan
under Military Rule p. 357.
,

72

session of wealth, power and status in Peru.
people and exclude people.

These practices include

They designate who is eligible to partici-

pate in the allocation of power, and they are the mechanisms for per-

petuating many of the features of Peruvian society.
In the 1960s the basic nature of Peruvian society was chal-

lenged.

Revolutionary groups tried to set up

of the extant order.

a

successful destruction

Society in Peru had become sufficiently differen-

tiated for significant groups in the population to be alienated from
the larger system.

They were sufficiently alienated to organize for

the purpose of destroying the existing political and economic rela-

tions in Peru.

That well-defined structure had been shaken.

The

larger society was not incorporating the more widely differentiated
The political system was not preventing the emer-

sectors of society.

gence of attempted cataclysmic change, neither was it defusing that

revolutionary thrust.
The complaint that "criollo liberalism” had failed Peru has

circulated since the 1920s.

By 1968 a large percentage of the officer

corps of the Peruvian military had come to accept this.

The military

had also become convinced that there was a real chance that Marxist

guerrillas could incite

a

successful revolution.

Faced with what they

considered to be a serious breakdown in the political system, combined

with a violent ai>peal for revolution, the military saw little else to
do but intervene.

The purpose of the resultant intervention was the

establisliment of an alternative political economy.

This alternative

political economy was supposed to preserve the larger political ethos
of the Peruvian status quo.

It would,

hopefully, leave the established

73

social groups reasonably intact.
The description of events that

I

have related in this chapter

suggests that the political actors in Peru believed that they had
three ideals of political economy that one could choose to organize

society around.

This would be a system of liberal democratic

capitalism, a system of revol ut ionary socialism, and a system of corporatism.

The alternative political economy that might provide the

conmion structure for integrating the differentiated units was seen as

a corporatist systeii).

Peru had an established counter-tradition that promised to provide a working social system.

Throughout the twentieth century a size-

able chunk of the Peruvian electorate had insisted that "criollo liberalism" had to be replaced.

They had also insisted that revolutionary

socialism had to be avoided.
society.

The fascits had advocated a corporate

The Apristas had called for functional democracy, and the

Christian Democrats had decided to press for a third way that would
replace capitalism.

This counter-tradition was invoked by the military.

It was Invoked because it was seen as the most plausible avenue for the

preservation of significant elements of the existing social order.
The principles

I

have enumerated are believed to be necessary to the

continued operation of society.

To this end the Peruvian military has

embarked on a program of corporatist experimentation.
In my following chapters

I

will describe how the policies of

the military have worked to preserve that specific political ethos.

maintain
will describe how the system of corporatism is designed to

designated parts of Peru's society.

I

i

C n A P T E R

'

V

I

THE VELASCO REGIME

I

I

On October

I

;

i

I

1968, the armed forces of Peru staged a coup and

3,

overthrew the civilian government of Fernando Belaunde Terry.
Cliarging the existing political order with corruption, incompetence

and abusive self-interest, the Revolutionary Military Government issued the First Statute of the Revolutionary Government.

This called

for the dissolution of the legislature and the assumption of legisla-

tive power by the president and the cabinet.

The military, in turn,

filled these positions.

Relying upon a Peruvian counter-tradition of political organ-

'

I

;

Izatiou, the military formally committed itself to instituting a new

corporatist government.

This was deemed necessary because the mili-

tary felt that the Peruvian political system was incapable of realizi

iiig

the interests of the country.

In the evaluation of the military,

j

tliey

were going to have to supplant the immoral extant system of

I

(

I

I

politics.
Once instituted, this singular government became the object

’

I

One subject that has engendered heated debate

of close scrutiny.

I

and much questioning is the motivation for the policies of the Revoj

^

*^^Palmer

,

p

.

1

.
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lutlonary Military Government.

other actions of this junta

I

By examining the choice of policies and

would like to offer

type of corporatism produced in Peru.
of corporatist systems

1

description of the

a

Utilizing the compound typology

abstracted in Chapter IV,

I

will try to place

the military government in a specific niche of corporatism.

I

will also

describe how that choice of corporatist organization works to preserve
the ethos

I

allude to.

The first pliase of military rule in Peru covers the period
1968 to 1975.

It

is

poratist structure.
be done by hindsight.

in this period that the military sets up the cor-

Interpreting the actions of the government has to
In and of itself the original proclamations

and initiatives of the government did not make it easy to divine the
intent of the government.

Much of what the government proclaimed was

vague enough to have several possible implicit meanings.
Leader of the coup and later

This is evident from the start.
[^resident.

General Juan Velasco Alvarada, gave as a rationale for the

military government the following famous declamation.

The central

figure of the junta stated that:

represented nothing more than
formal democracy
the interplay of political interests, for which the people
and its great problems were always secondary matters.
The legitimacy of this Revolutionary Government cannot
rest on the respect for the rules of a politically decadent
game which only benefitted the privileged groups of the
Our objectives have nothing to do with the tradicountry.
Our legitimacy does
tional forms of cr iollo politics.
system which is
political
of
a
...
votes
not come from the
to defend the
served
never
has
it
because
rotten to the core
people.
Peruvian
the
authentic interests of
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

108
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Such a rationale does not help place the
military government
in a scale of corporatism.

It speaks of what must be avoided.

Please

note the forms of crioHo politics are labeled
as reprehensible, not the

cr^oU^ social

order.

Also note that it is the interplay of political

interests that causes problems, and not the value
orientation of
cr iollo society.

The commitment of the military was made much more concrete
when
they explained that the revolution would offer a system of
revolution-

ary humanism.

Politics as such would be replaced by a system of

participatory social democracy.

Revolutionary humanism would be

achieved by establishing social justice.

Social justice was somewhat

circumspectly defined as "The provision of each citizen with the economic means to move from subsistence, to pursue in harmony with society
full social and cultural development." 109

Palmer deduces four facets of participatory social democracy.
These four factors are the moral order of solidarity, worker management, social property, and self-government within the individual's

day-to-day assoc iations

.

As defined by the government these charac-

teristics place their political experiment squarely in the corporatist
cont inuum

The moral order of solidarity is to be fostered by the creation of a corporate system of participation.

The people will be formed

into local units of participation to manage their workplaces and resi-

109
1

JO

Ibid

.

Ibid.

,

l^-

52.

.
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dences.

The people will be instructed in government; they will
then

acquire experience and

a

change in their economic status.

As the citi-

zens are judged to have acquired the ability to rule
themselves, their
role in government will be expanded to include local
government.

After this, governance of the nation will be achieved.

Labor and

capital will be given equal input into economic enterprises

Now with this type of commitment
down the scale of corporatist systems.
a

it

is possible to start moving

The functional interests have

very clear relation to the state in these pronouncements.

is defined as groupings of functional interests.

Society

And in this cor-

porate system of participation the government has decided it will or-

ganize these interests and instruct them.
set up an agency.

To this end the government

By proclamation, on June 24,

1971, SINAMOS was set

up and charged with:
1.

Training, orienting, and organizing the national populat

ion;

2.

The development of corporate organizations for society;

3.

Handling communication between the government and the
national population.

This is a clear conmiitment to State Corporatism.

113

The functional in-

terest groups are set up as dependent organs of the state, and the

government
it

drav^;s

its legitimacy from another source.

is the armed forces.

^^^Ibid.,

p.

54.

^^^Ibid., p.

91.

'^^See page 39 of this thesis for this typology.
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.
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With that point established one next has to look at the commitments the government has made in the period 1968 to 1975.

allow you to further classify events and determine

if

This will

this has been an

Inclusionary Corporatism or an Exclusionary Corporatism.
The government in Peru has written its policies here, in

clear and unmistakable terms.

It has both initiated positive programs

and reacted in a repressive manner.

The government’s initiatives

turned to the formation of new national communities.

With the Agrarian

Reform Law of June 24, 1969, the government nationalized the large

agricultural holdings of the native elite and foreign companies

Agrarian cooperatives were established.

The accompanying political

units were organized into Agrarian Social Interest Societies (S.A.I.S.).
This was followed by the establishment of an Industrial Community on
July 27, 1970.^^^

The Fishing Community was organized on March 26,

1971, and the Mining Community was organized June 9, 1971.^^^

This concern with establishing state-sanctioned functional in-

terests continued in an unblushing carrot-and-stick fashion.

Not only

were groups encouraged to seek out the government's path, many were

punished for failing to stick to the straight and narrow.

In 1969,

the older National Agrarian Society tried to contest the Agrarian

Reform Law.

In retaliation the government declared it illegal and cre-

ated the National Peasant Association to replace it.^^^

^^"^Palmer,
^

117

Ibid

131.

,

p.

116.

.

,

p

.

117.

.

,

p

.

156

^^Ibid.

^Ibid
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also moved to secure a monopoly on public access to information.

November 10, 1971, the government passed
tlie
.
try.

a law

On

giving the government

right to reorganize the radio and television stations of the coun118

As the government was presented with resistance it continued
to react.

In November 1973, the national teachers' union, SUTEP, was

captured by Marxists in internal elections.

That elicited a swift with-

drawal of recognition by the government. 119

Political parties also

drew more than scorn from the government.
ment outlawed APRA once more. 120

In May 1974,

the govern-

And finally, after a long running

confrontation, the government nationalized the country's newspapers on
July 27, 1974.^^^
In differentiating between Inclusionary Corporatism or Exclu-

sionary Corporatism, you must decide if the government has pursued a
policy of activating or deactivating social groups.

As the government

has acted in a two-steps-f orward-and-one-step-back fashion, this be-

comes a subjective judgment.

My reading of its activities is a read-

ing that sees the government as concerned with control.

The government

insists on structuring participation, and is very concerned that things
do not get out of control.

That strikes me as a decision to engage

in Exclusionary Corporatism.

118
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This commitment to State Corporatism and a program of Exclu-

sionary Corporatism is also marked by a policy of Bi-Frontal Corporatism.

In this system of Bi-Frontal Corporatism that the military

operated, one can see both Privatist Corporatism and Statizing Corporatism.

The Privatizing Corporatism can be seen in the commitment

of the military to setting up economic communities and allowing them
to receive benefits from the government.

Here the offices of the

state have been opened to select groups to give the government a

greater degree of control.

Statizing Corporatism is evident in the policies of the government.

There is no question that the government has been interested

in penetrating and subverting independent social groupings.

The ex-

tant political parties have been the object of a policy of repression

and co-optation.

Witness their being cold-shouldered by the creation

of SINAMOS to do many of the functions they once did.

have not faired well either.

The labor unions

The creation of communities to manage

sectors of the economy eliminates the management-labor split and works
to subvert that existing independent social grouping.

This system of State Corporatism with its program of Exclu-

sionary Corporatism, its Bi-Frontal Corporatism, and its dual policy
of Privatizing Corporatism and Statizing Corporatism; this political

program also conserves elements of the older value system.

The cor-

maintain
poratizing program of the military has effectively worked to
the specific ethos that

I

outlined in the last chapter.

The clearest

ideals and
example of this is the linkage between Catholic Christian

government policy.

never
The Revolutionary Military Government has

81

lieslLaLed to portray its concerns as one with the Church.

The "moral

message of Christianity" was affirmed in the "affinity of the thought
of the Cliurch of the poor and the exploited and that of the
Armed

Forces and the revolutionary population in the common cause of building a new society in Peru." 122

The military has also felt it advan-

tageous to explain its temporal concerns as consistent with the

Church's teachings.
is

The hostility of the military to class struggle

officially related to the concern with a moral order of solidarity

as "workers and management should be a family, the class struggle has
no place here,

in a society of solidarity."

123

On a less obvious level the military's commitment to Catholic

Christian ideals is reflected in its choice of advisors and consultants.
Substantially prior to the coup, the military had displayed an interest in contemporary Catholic through!.

Higher Military Studies (CAEM)

,

At the much-touted Center for

the military began inviting prominent

clerical figures such as Msgr. Lebret

,

to lecture.

124

After the mili-

tary seized power, their commitment to Catholic Christian ideals may
be seen in their acceptance of sizeable segments of the Christian

Democratic program.

Social property was given political credence by

the Fifth International Christian Democratic Congress in October

1959.^^^

In the 1960s,

the Christian Democrats of Peru committed

themselves to establishing empresa communitar la
122

123

Palmer,
Ibid

.

125

Ibid.

p.

,

^^"^KnighL

p.

,

p.

52.

58.

358.

.

In the fall of 1968,
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the concept was proposed in legislation.

Once the military came in

they turned to this ideal and the people who championed it.

The commitment to elite politics also stands out in a clear

manner.

is the military as a qualified and self-prepared elite v/ho

It

has set themselves up to save the country.

Policy, initiatives, and

decisions flow from the top to the bottom.

This is recognized and

referred to by many analysts.

It does not appear to be seriously

disputed by anyone.
The issue of segmentary incorporation is more complex.

miJitary

lias

advocated a strong, revolutionary ideology and

rather strongly committed to democratizing society.

it

The
has been

The junta has,

however, been ambivalent about dismantling segmentary relations.

It

was also not unduly concerned with avoiding programs that produce
de facto segmentary incorporation.

De facto segmentary incorporation

may be observed on a wide spectrum.

The government talked of creating

social property to create a new relationship between workers and

property.

The government offered this as evidence of its good revo-

lutionary credentials.

Studies carried out at a later date suggested

that no more than 10% of the industrial work force would benefit from
the enabling legislation.

127

That left the greater part of the work

force unincorporated into the new order.

The economic communities offer an example of the junta's un-

easiness over discontinuing policies of partial or incomplete incorporation.

1

1

Economic communities were set up to reorder the relationship

'?6

Ibid.
?7

,

p.

359.

New York Times, November

6,

1974, p.

2.
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of workers, management, and capital.

They were also intended to es-

tablish a direct relationship with the government.

This establishing

of economic communities did not confer equal
economic benefits for all

parties.

The well-to-do Fishing and Mining Communities were allowed

share in the rather good-sized profits they generated.

The less-well-

off Industrial Communities and the impoverished Agricultural
Communi-

ties only had access to the revenue they generated.

was little transfer of funds.

Within communi-

Well-to-do sugar coops

did not have to make significant transfers to subsistence highland

dairy operations.

This overt program of conferring unequal economic

benefits to different sectors of the economy was coupled with a refusal
to reorganize

tlie

tax structure to transfer wealth.

129

This is an

example of a decision to continue the segmentary incorporation of
society.
The acceptance, more than the advocacy, of segmentary incor-

poration is also reflected in the Revolutionary Military Government's
policy on urban land seizure.

Initially, the government was hostile

to using land invasions for political brokerage.

Allegedly this was

due to a concern of the armed forces that the government should func-

tion through the military as an institution, not through personalismo

i;
.

Land seizures did not stop with the promise of a better life under the

1

in

Tii e

OO

Richard Webb, "Government Policy and Distribution of Income,"
Peruvian Experiment ed Abraham Lowenthal, p. 121.
,
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Lowenthal, "Peru's Ambiguous Revolution," Foreign
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Collier, p. 151.
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Revolutionary Military Government.
establish squatter settlements.

There were repeated attempts to

Faced with the reality of a housing

shortage that was not disappearing any time soon and a population
versed
in the potential for successful land seizure, the military
chose to

give SINAMOS the responsibility for new settlements.

charged with settling people on suitable lands.

SINAMOS was
The flagrant

brokerage that characterized pre-coup Peru was avoided.

The military,

however, maintained a control mechanism to channel incorporation.
The emphasis on authentically national solutions may also be

readily established.

Taking up the old cry for solutions that reflect

the special problems of Peru, President Velasco stressed the importance
of creating new forms of economic organization.

The creatioii of social

property was offered as proof of the government's commitment to seeking out that which is neither capitalist nor communist.

132

This em-

phasis is a direct continuation of programs the civilian political
parties have advocated.

The experience of professionalization in the

military has been a force for seeking Peruvian solutions.

The previous-

ly-mentioned Center for Higher Military Studies is cited as a force for
raising a strong nationalist consciousness amongst the officer corps.
An insistence on national solutions is attributed to the learning en-

vironment of the CAEM.

The insistence on national solutions that is

cited in government programs is an honest appeal to a long-standing
131
132

133

Ibid.

,

p

.

Knight, p.

151
351,

Lowenthal, The Peruvian Experiment

,

p.

30.

133
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intellectual and political tradition.
The concern with

standing tradition.
in her essay,

Politics."

tlie

middle sectors is also part of a long-

Jane Jacquette has produced an argument for this

"Belaunde and Velasco: On the Limits of Ideological

Jacquette discusses the discernable continuity between

the policies of APRA, AP and the Revolutionary Military Government.

She very concretely argues that:

The purpose of comparing ideology and practice under
Belaunde and Velasco is to discuss parallels
through
the identification of key similarities between Belaunde's
ideology and that of the Velasco regime. These similarities rest on shared middle class and technocratic values,
including a deep fear of violent revolution,
.

.

.

Beyond a sharing of larger middle-class values, there are very specific

policy issues

tl)at

display this.

policy of the Velasco regime.
sors, such as APRA or AP

,

This is evident in the economic

Consonant with their civilian precur-

the economic policy of the junta shares the

belief that the motor force of economic development lies outside the
state bureaucracy

The labor communities received much publicity,

.

however the national bourgeoisie was seen as a vital force for national development.

As a result the government has channelled credit,

created incentives and tried to exhort the middle sectors to join the

programs and support the Revolutionary Military Government.
Tliis

goal

affirmation of ethos that

I

136

argue for is an important

The corporatist structure and the corporatizing programs have

.

Jacquette,
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been set up to make structural changes.

It

has been hoped that these

programs would successfully maintain a very important value system; an

operating code thought vital
of civil society.

if not

indispensable for the continuation

This situation, alas, did not work out as desired.

The Revolutionary Military Government set up by Velasco and his circle
of backers fell upon dire circumstances.

A series of conflicts in the

period between the Spring of 1974 and the Spring of 1975 resulted in the
replacement of Velasco by General Francisco Morales Bermudez.

With the

advent of Morales Bermudez the revolution takes a substantially different tack.

CHAPTER

Vil

THE SHIFT IN NATIONAL POLICY

With the advent of the regime of General Frangisco Morales

Bermudez the "revolution" of

tlie

military took an abrupt turn.

The

issue of ethos maintenaiice was handled in a radically different manner by the two regimes.
his

During the ascendancy of General Velasco and

'radicals" in the military, ethos maintenance was pursued by an

organized program of corporatist institution building.

The regime of

Bermudez may be characterized by its emphasis on repression.

With the

failure of many corporatizing programs and the active opposition of a

growing sector of the Peruvian establishment, the government abandoned
institution-building.

The majority military opinion was that ethos

maintenance would have to be pursued by repressing disruptive elements.

The move to an emphasis on repressing disruptive elements

was precipitated by an expanding crisis.

The organized and the estab-

lished elements of Peruvian society had not silently acquiesced to the

Neither had they succumbed to their

Revolutionary Military Government.
Involuntary suspension.

Instead the period from 1968 to 1975 was marked

by several general strikes, a series of bloody mine strikes, politi-

cally inspired riots and unregulated peasant invasions.

At the same

time the government had taken control of the radio and TV stations,

banned

tlie

political parties, seized the newspapers and engaged in
87

a

88

program of jai]fng and deporting political activists.

In spite of

the government's display of force, a police rebellion was fomented
in
1975.

This persistent and spirited resistance resulted in a retrench-

ment and reevaluation by the military.
By 1975, serious internal and external problems beset the mili-

tary.

The corporatizing programs were neither producing the support

desired nor eliminating as much of the resistance as was needed.

The

i[iterna tional economy faltered and produced undesirable terms of trade

for Peruvian coimnodities

erratic to disrupt the
tlie

1

.

The Humboldt current became sufficiently

ishing industry.

The IMF began to pressure

junta to make severe alterations in its budget.

The pressures

on the military multiplied dramatically and the military's ability to

control

the political arena began to deteriorate.

creased within the military.
of the armed forces.

Differences in-

This led to a progressive polarization

The resultant institutional conflict produced

an interest in withdrawing from the risk-fraught process of governing.

The retreat into a program of repression was precipitated by
a

convergence of crises.

The crisis is a composite one.

There is an

economic crisis, a political crisis and an institutional crisis.

Holding center stage is the economic crisis.

The combination of

massive international borrowing and a distressed economy have kept
the Peruvian economy in jeopardy since 1976.

This economic crisis is both of the military's making and not
of the military's making.

After seizing power the junta engaged in a

massive program of investment to build a strong national economy.
The major engine of development was the national government.

The

,

.
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principle source of capital was foreign loans.

Between 1965 and 1973,

the government's share of the economy rose from 16% to 55%.^^^

Be-

tween 1972 and 1977, the government quintupled its international debt

from one billion dollars to five billion dollars.

This government

directed program of investment was predicated on several assumptions.

The government was committed to the export of commodities to support
the economic plans.

After the discovery of oil in the Amazon basin,

the government began to look forward to the export of oil.

The govern-

ment assumed that the number one foreign exchange earner, the fishmeal

industry, would be reliable.

It

also looked forward to significant

returns from the copper deposits it was opening.
Events, alas, worked against the Peruvians.

disappeared from Peruvian waters.

1

39

The anchovies

This was damaging enough.

Worse luck yet, the Amazonian oil deposits failed to prove out.

Mem-

bers of the international banking community had expected to see Peru
export a billion dollars of oil a year by 1980.

140

On these grounds

the government had secured a 750 million dollar loan to build a ques-

tionable trans-Andean pipeline.

heavily in new copper mines.

141

The government had also invested

Unfortunately, the second half of the

1970s saw a depressed international market for copper.
137
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mitted the Peruvian government to large fixed loan payments.

As the

strategic Peruvian industries failed to produce the needed foreign
earnings the government was forced to curtail the national budget.
Due to severe differences over how to alter the budget and a reluctance to believe that the economy was imperiled, Peru wobbled close
to default on its international loans.
Tlie

blame for this state of affairs is hard to place.

tional lenders had sought out Peru as a prudent investment.
as 1975, experts from the IMF,

InternaAs late

the World Bank, and major private lend-

ing institutions were agreed that Peru could comfortably handle $2.8

billion in additional development loans.

1A 3

The military in turn

eagerly rose to the occasion and came up with 84 projects that could
absorb $6 billion in loans.

144

They were able to secure some $3 bil-

lion in loans before things began to collapse.

145

In an environment of shrinking earnings and growing debt

obligations the government found itself confronted with a no-win
situation.

Continued investment in Peru and access to foreign capital

goods, energy and armaments were seen as an absolute necessity.

Fail-

ure to meet loan obligations might deprive Peru from access to these

The only sure formula for meeting these debts were austerity

items.

budgets.

This had been insisted upon by both the IMF and private

lenders.

Substantial cuts in the government's budget meant choosing

between restricting the large armaments purchases or severely cutting
143

Ibid., p
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.

17.

Ibid.
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social expenditures.

Stringent pursuit of either option would be an

explosive policy for the reigning administration.

Needless to say,

Morales Bermudez waffled on this as long as possible.

sufficiently dire to bring about action.

Events became

A consortium of private banks

monitored the Peruvian economy for six months.

Allegedly they ab-

stained from giving the Peruvian government any direct orders.

After

the sol was devalued by 30%, the budget severely cut, imports
cut,

price controls removed and wage controls set up, a $390 million loan
was extended.

146

These austerity measures were bitterly unpopular.

They weakened the government and drove people into the waiting arms of
the political parties.

As neither the Peruvian economy improved nor

the debt service disappeared this scene was repeated later.

around it was the IMF that was appealed to.

This time

The IMF pointedly in-

sisted that the huge budget deficits were the cause of the Peruvian

government's difficulties.

In the 1977 budget,

the Peruvian govern-

ment had allowed for a deficit of $625 million.^^^

The fact that arms

purchases were estimated at $300 million a year for the two years prior
did not sit well with the IMF.

148

A compromise was struck that gave

Peru $100 million in stand-by credits and improved their standing with

private lenders.

149

This extended down-spiral of the Peruvian economy coupled with

146,,
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the abrasive austerit/ measures has alienated some
supporters of the

regime and driven many people from quiescence into active
opposition.

ibis has pushed the government into a repressive role.
the political crisis has centered on the resiliency and effec-

tiveness of the pre-coup political parties.

The government had been

concerned with supplanting independent political groups with statecreated and state-regulated interest groups.
been the government agency SINAMOS.

The chosen vehicle had

The efforts to erect corporatist

interest groups never met the expectations of the military.
failed abjectly.

survived.

SINAMOS

Many interest groups and all the political parties

The organizations created by SINAMOS either languished for

lack of participation or were captured by political activists of the

pre-coup political parties.
The labor organizations were an immediate object of the

government's corporatizing programs.
in many unions.

APRA had long been established

The communists controlled the largest labor organ-

ization, the Conf ederacion Generale de Trabajadores (CGT).

SINAMOS

set up the rival Central de Trabajadores Revolucionario Peruana

(GTRP).^^^

The government-sponsored organization failed to make in-

roads into established labor constituencies and never became relevant
to the labor scene.

The efforts of SINAMOS to organize the agricultural sectors
was not much more successful.

The Conf ederacion National Agraria (CNA)

was set up to organize the agricultural sector.

^^*^hatin Americ.i,

January 10, 1975,

p.

14.

Although the CNA
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successfully Incur poriiLed many agrlcu]tural units, the APRA-controlled
sugar coops stayed out of

And even more ominously, a communist-

backed CoTifederacion Campesinos del Peru (CCP) developed.

actively competed
^

152

.

,

the government for the sympathies of the dis-

v^;ith

tressed campesinos

The CCP

.

On another front SINAMOS had been set the task of organizing
a

competitor to

tlie

leftist-controlled teacher's union, SUTEP.

The

government set up the Sindicate de Educadores Revoluclonarios del
153

Peru (SERP).

Operating under the auspices of SINAMOS, SERP was

to wean the teachers

from their independent ways.

That never came to

In the national elections for the state teacher's agency SUTEP-

pass.

backed candidates absolutely trounced the SERP slates.

15A

The original strategy behind setting up a national organization to channel political participation had been an interest in con-

trolling political activities.

SINAMOS had produced a dismal record.

Not only did the programs fail to undercut the established political

organizations, but SINAMOS prodded many groups into active opposition.
SINAMOS

's

received.

reputation as an agent of government control was negatively
It made it a liability to be associated with SINAMOS.

Another disturbing development was the Frankenstein evolution
of some or gani za t i ons

^^^

The CNA was set up to organize the agricultural

.

Latin Am erica, May 9, 1975,

p.

42.

January 24, 1975,

p.

29.

^^^Latin America, October 31, 1976,

p.

343.

^^^La tin America

,

153.,
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sectors for the government.

By

late 1976 the CNA had displayed signs

of being both criticaJ and unresponsive to the government

The CNA

.

had evolved into an active opponent of the government.

The lackluster record of SINAMOS and its government-sponsored
organizations disappointed large numbers of the military.
the government

liad

By 1976,

stopped looking for a solution in nationally-

sponsored institutions.

This visible retreat by the government

spurred more resistance from the Peruvian political establishment.
The third crisis was the institutional crisis of the military.

From

tlie

beginning of the Revolutionary Military Government there has

been a demand

tliat

the institutional integrity of the military remain

Personal ismo

intact.

,

alliances with the political parties or plotting

to overthrow the revolutionary junta of the three branches of the armed

forces was strictly off limits.
P ronunciamen to

General Velasco was removed by a

Institut ional of the revolutionary council.

156

„
Bermudez
,

did not seize his office for his own ends.
Tlie

over

tlie

mi Jitary was seriously rocked by bitter internal disputes

course of

tlie

This became evident in the period

revolution.

between February 1975 and April 1976.
of

tlie

Throughout

tJie

larger period

Revolutionary Military Government, there had been differences.

However, by 1975

tlie

military had become seriously polarized.

Sig-

category of
nificant numbers of the officers could be placed in the
radical or conservative.

in_^erj_cji, October 8,
’^^’batin America,

September

1976, p.
5,

311.

1975, p.

274.
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Under the leadership of General Velasco much of the policy of
the government could be described as "radical" or change-oriented.

The dissatisfaction with the results of these programs culminated in
the removal of Velasco.

Domestic turmoil escalated and more and more

of the military began to advocate a comprehensive program of repres-

sion to keep events under control.

The fragile majority opinion held

that the political turmoil would be worsened by abandoning the revolution and openly v,/arring against radical elements.

The conservative

minority was large enough to plot and intrigue without serious hindrance
from the government.

The police rebellion of February 5, 1975, was taken as a sign
by many officers that the government had foolishly encouraged radical

elements with its policies.
a

From then until Morales Bermudez declared

second phase for the revolution, the institutional integrity of the

military was sadly neglected by many officers.
The pressures on Velasco resuited in his replacement by

Morales Bermudez.

The departure of Velasco did not placate all of

the conservative elements in the military.

cers

\-jere

These disgruntled offi-

sufficiently distressed to look for an occasion to stage a

successful coup.
On the niglit of February 13, 1976, General Gonzalo Briceno

issued an ultinuitum to the government to stop dealing with radical

elements and start
General Briceno and

a

crackdown.
lie

Other military units failed to join

was successfully censured and dismissed from

.
.
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his comniaad
dent.

Briceao's ill-timed gambit was not an isolated inci-

.

Later that sunmier General Carlos Bobbio Centurion ordered the

troops out of the Lima barracks to take up defensive positions

around the city.

Alleging that

a

compact mass of people were moving

on the city he ordered the troops out to their preplanned defensive positions.

158

Bobbio neglected to contact his superior officer General

Jorge Fernandez Maldonado.

Maldonado

The furious Prime Minister Fernandez

radical) demanded and received Bobbie's resignation.

(a

159

These ill-concealed invitations to a coup clearly communicated that
conservative elements were insisting on comprehensive changes if the

Revolutionary Military Government were to remain in power.
These cracks in institutional integrity were slowly patched
up by Morales Bermudez.

He recognized that the military would no long-

er support the unrestrained turmoil produced by the attempts at policy
He therefore accepted the message being communicated to

innovation.
him.

In April of 1976, Morales Bermudez propounded a theory of revolu-

u
tion that described all revolutions as having two phases.
.

,

160

_
ihe

first phase of change and innovation had been adequately explored
by the Velasco regime.

The second phase of the revolution was a phase
1^-1

of clarification and consolidation.

In the future the government

_ America, February 27, 1976,
Latin

157-

158-

P-

Latin America, July 16, 1976, p. 186.

159.,

.

Ibid

160-
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,

Latin America, April 9, 1976,
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would concentrate on meeting the demands of the original innovations.

The three converging crises that

I

have described have com-

bined to push the government into a reversal of policy.

The program

of corporatist institut ion— building has given way to a program of

repression.

maintenance.

The military is still very mucli concerned with ethos
Tliey

have, however, lost faith in the ability of corpora-

tist institutions to do the task by themselves.

The military appears

to hold the attitude that elements of the old ethos can be kept func-

tioning by using the simple expedient of repression.
thing of a regression for the military and
much promise.

1

This is some-

do not see it holding

CHAPTER

V

1

1

I

CONCLUSION

The corporaList politics of the Revolutionary Military Government have been a singular experiment.

No other government in Latin

America, military or civilian, has made such a comprehensive attempt
to

fall back upon the corporatist counter-tradition that has coexisted

with most of the formally liberal-capitalist systems of the region.

The

decision to save the old value system while discarding the old power
structure is

a

remarkably sophisticated program that few militaries

in Latin America have thought of trying.

How events worked out for the military is another matter.

The

seemingly well-intentioned military was greeted with resounding disapproval.
tance,

Taking heed of the lack of support and determined resis-

the military decided to opt for the traditional course for

military governments.

The military abandoned its program of corpora—

tist institution-building and reverted to the familiar threat of grue-

some repression if events proved too outrageous.

The head of the

Revolutionary Military Government, Morales Bermudez, announced the
assemwithdrawal of the military and the scheduling of a constituent

bly and elections.
mo re vital creations,

^^^^

S

LNAMOS was abolished along with one of its

the Confederacion National Agraria.

Latin Ame rjxj^ jol_itlcaj Report

,

January 6, 1978,

^^\atin America Political Report, June
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9,

1978, p.
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p.
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out the wiLlidrawal

the government declared a general amnesty for all

political and social prisoners.

ilris

was followed by an announce-

ment that the newspa|)ers seized by the government would be resold to
tlieir

former owners.
Faced with a completely unsatisfactory set of affairs, the mili-

tary gave politics back to the civilians.

There are many lessons here.

Perhaps one of the most pertinent lessons illustrated here is the

limitation of enlightened self-interest as a vehicle for change.

The

military had assumed it could successfully appeal to the Peruvian
political establ ishmi'nt

There was an assumption that "those organ-

.

ized in defense of their interests" could be made to see the wisdom of

the military's action.

In return,

the military could count on their

support while reorganizing society to coopt or suppress revolutionary
elements.

The military, unfortunately, never got a very high degree of

support from the Peruvian political establishment.

Neither the

unions nor the activists from the major political parties ever had a

very great degree of trust in the military.

Although the Peruvian es-

tablishment will close ranks and back the military in the face of violent revolution, and possibly a foreign war, things break down for
less dramatic events.

If

the stakes do not appear to be as high, then

the different elements of society strike out to preserve their own in-

terests.

A situation like this guarantees a vigorous and coherent

repression of revolutionary forces.
164
165

It also means that it will be

Latin America Political Report, July 28, 1978,
Ibid.

p.

29.

.
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difficult to make structural reforms.

Another aspect of the limitations of enlightened self-interest
may be seen in the military.

Wlien

it

became apparent that the initial

program of corporatist institution-building was inadequate, and the
population was turning against them, the military reverted to oldfashioned repression.

The military should have known from their own

experience that repression alone will not stop forces for change.

Their

original decision to be, selectively, as revolutionary as the revolu-

tionaries was a much wiser course of action.

As pressure mounted on

the military, rational self-interest failed to reassure many officers.

An anxious military chose to employ threats of violence, rather than

move into an unfamiliar environment.

The wliole issue of ethos maintenance remains in the political

arena in Peru.

The need to establish a common structure capable of

relating the different units is still a major concern.

Although the

military is handing power back to the civilians, it may not have abanWhat the unsuspecting

doned its concern with ethos maintenance.

military put itself through may serve as
son to keep

tlie

a

powerful enough object les-

political parties sensitive to the need for ethos

maintenance
The military experimentation has had a conservatlzing effect.
of wealth
The point has been made that the significant redistribution

sectors to less
and power means a transfer of wealth from productive

productive sectors.

It

also means a transfer of power from the sec-

of their interests
tors of society already well organized in defense
to

people.
the numerous unorganized and impoverished

Such a course

action would produce a severe diminution of wealth and power among the
extant power holders.

bitterly unpopular.

Attempts by the military to do this have been
It would be expecting a lot

to have the established

power holders redistribute themselves out of power and out of influence.
The popular pressures for change have not diminished.

will not be so blithely entered into.

However, reform

The military had attempted to

implement many of the traditional Aprista and Christian Democrat reforms.
Some of these programs were not particularly successful, and other pro-

grams were very controversial.

The Apristas and others have had the

benefit of having the military stick its neck out and receive the onus
for a number of failures.

reform politicians

The military's actions may have convinced

it is wiser to advocate less sweeping change.

tliat

For the time being, it appears that the politicians are not

about to leap into very many fundamental changes.

The one exception is

the subject of universal suffrage.

One of the elements of the Peruvian political ethos that

argued for in my paper was a commitment to elite politics.

suffrage was the issue

I

suggested that reflected this.

I

Universal

The Peruvian

political parties had displayed an extreme allergy to the idea of uni-

versal suffrage.

No political party in the twentieth century has ad-

vocated universal suffrage.
Deraocrlstianos

,

Not APRA, not Acclon Popular, not the

not the communists, not the left-splinter parties.

With the recent (1978) exception of Hugo Blanco

Obreros, Campesinos,

y

s

FOCEP (Frente de

Estudiantils Popular), no political party has

with such
felt it could threaten the politically significant minority
a

and goods.
bald-faced commitment to a radical redistribution of power

102

ihis has radically changed.

Hugo Blanco, the former Trotsky-

ite guerrilla, has successfully pushed for universal suffrage.

Al-

though the institution of a system of one man/one vote has a strong

potential for change,

tliere

is an irony here.

The implacable demand

of the forces for radical change is now centered on voting rights.

This is a significant change from 1965.

At that time, Hugo Blanco and

others established a peasant rebellion with the avowed goal of creating
a

successful socialist revolution.

167

The fact that Hugo Blanco was

permitted to be politically active, and the fact that Blanco seemed to
feel
a

that the proper focus for the radical forces was the vote indicates

change.

Although repression by itself is no solution, the military has

demonstrated

tliat

it

can successfully destroy guerrilla operations.

Events have also displayed that the political establishment will back
the military in an environment of immediate threats to the system.

Given these demonstrated realities the radical establishment is now

pursuing the path of non-violence.
The question of the success or the failure of a program of

The military pursued its pro-

ethos maintenance can also be addressed.

gram of institution-building out of the fear that "criollo liberalism
had failed and would fail to protect the true interests of the Peruvian

social order.

Going by its own avowed goals, the Revolutionary Military

Government has failed, and it is withdrawing from politics.
^^^^

Latin Amer ica Political Report
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poratisni will not be instituted in Peru.
Wliat

system.

stands out is the durability of the Peruvian political

"Criollo liberalism" is every bit as much a part of the estab-

lished system as government-sponsored interest groups.

The forces of

"criollo liberalism" successfully withstood twelve years of suspension,
and occasional repression.

The military could not operate without the

support of the "system" and neither can the radicals.

It is a tribute

to the political acumen of Blanco that he is choosing to push for

non-violent reform.

It may be the only path open to him.

The advent

of universal suffrage may also work for ethos maintenance.

rights in and of tliemselves confer no inherent changes.

Voting

Opponents

of this move have raised specters of tax leveling, the election of

There is no guarantee

large numbers of Indians, and immediate change.

The political brokers have not disap-

that this will come to pass.

peared from politics in Peru.

There is a tremendous potential for

manipulation of a large mass of political ignorant people.
suffrage can also he

a

Universal

force for conservatism, for ethos maintenance.

Given that the mi Jitary was not panicked into a coup by this, there
is a tacit

acceptance of this.

They may see the conservative poten-

tial here.
Tills

durable Peruvian political order is not well appreciated

by other analysts of Peru.

be adequately explained.

The theory of politics in Peru has yet to

There are forces operating, and my analytic

approach does a good job of explaining them.

I

argue that an

ethos gives an
analytic emphasis on the elements of the political

investigator information

tliat

has to be accounted for.

I

believe that

104

Lhis is a productive path.

and it has not stopped.

Ethos maintenance is an ongoing process

The military has succeeded in having the terms

of political discourse defined to protect most
of the value system.

though its formal experiment is over, it has guaranteed
the avoidance
of violent and radical change.

A1
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